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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Political Economy
by
Dodge Tyler Cahan
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Julie Cullen, Chair
This dissertation examines three topics in political economy. Chapter 1 studies
electoral cycles in public sector employment around US gubernatorial elections. Chapter
2 investigates the well-known fact that the US economy grew faster during Democratic
presidencies and to what extent this phenomenon generalizes with respect to state-level
elected offices. Chapter 3 studies how the use of best-worst voting rules influences the
strategic position-taking behavior of political candidates in a spatial election model.
xii
Chapter 1
Electoral cycles in government
employment: Evidence from US
gubernatorial elections
1
Abstract: Incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment
before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards. I investigate electoral cycles in public
sector employment around US gubernatorial elections. Exploiting staggered gubernatorial
election cycles across states, I use both county fixed effects models and a geographic
discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference
in gubernatorial election cycles. Consistent with manipulation, state and local government
employment per capita are higher leading up to elections; afterwards, employment abruptly
returns to normal. Political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated, including by
election competitiveness, term limits, incumbent party affiliation, and ideological alignment
between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens. Differences across types
of government employment, and private sector employment, are also explored.
Keywords: electoral cycles; government employment; state borders; border discon-
tinuity design; gubernatorial elections.
1.1 Introduction
Political office is highly sought after, and politicians may go to substantial lengths
to use the political resources at their disposal to their or their party’s electoral advantage.
This has led to the prediction of various “opportunistic political cycles” in a range of policy
variables and outcomes. Such actions that are not necessarily motivated by the best interests
of society are referred to broadly as “manipulation” (Nordhaus, 1975). Since economic
conditions play an important role when voters form their opinions of politicians (Fair,
2
1981; Erikson, 1989; Klomp and de Haan, 2013), the period leading up to an election may
produce particularly strong incentives for incumbents to create the impression of a strong
economy, signaling ability (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988) or avoiding bad news at the wrong
time (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004).
One key component of the economy that politicians may seek to influence is
employment. I investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment in the context
of US gubernatorial elections. Governors and their party allies may have the ability to
raise employment levels leading up to elections, or delay employment reducing decisions
until afterwards. This could happen through the allocation of public funds in the state
budget (Blais and Nadeau, 1992; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004), through the timing
of employment policies, large projects and procurement contracts (Mechtel and Potrafke,
2013; Garmann, 2017), by favoring employment friendly policies such as lower business
taxes during election periods (Foremny and Riedel, 2014), and so on. Artificial fluctuations
in government employment have the potential to affect the provision of local public services,
induce wasteful spending, and crowd out more productive investments.
Anecdotal evidence of manipulation by governors abounds. During his 2014 re-
election campaign, Connecticut governor Dannel Malloy dismissed nonpartisan reports of
a growing budget deficit; two weeks after winning re-election, he announced a statewide
freeze on hiring not “essential for critical agency operations” and on state contracting.
Republican lawmakers accused Malloy of misleadingly delaying the bad news until after
the election. As House Republican leader Larry Cafero put it: “The governor recognizes
that the election’s over. . . not more than a week in, it’s like, ‘Forget what I said on the
3
campaign trail.’”1
In the 2014-2015 Florida budget, taking effect four months prior to the election,
incumbent Rick Scott vetoed $8 million out of $280 million in legislator-approved “supple-
mental funding” (informally, “sprinkle lists”) aimed at providing additional or first time
funding for various projects and programs. At the same time, he vetoed $69 million out of
$77 billion in the overall budget. The following year, a non-election year, he vetoed a much
larger $145 million out of $301 million in supplemental funding and $461 million out of
$78 billion in the overall budget. Victims of the cuts included $1.5 million in funding for
a storm risk center at Florida State University, and $15 million for a new campus of the
University of Central Florida in Orlando. “There is just no consistency this year,” said State
Senate Majority Leader Bill Galvano of the discrepancy.2
I provide empirical evidence that electoral cycles in public sector employment
around US gubernatorial elections are more than anecdotal, and their nature is consistent
with the manipulation hypothesis. Gubernatorial elections in the US offer several empirical
advantages – they are staggered and follow historically fixed schedules, allowing me to
exploit differences in election cycles across states. I use both traditional county fixed effects
specifications and a geographic discontinuity design that compares counties at state borders
where, on one side of the border there is a gubernatorial election taking place, while on the
other side there is not, and allows to control for prevailing economic conditions at a very
local level. Moreover, rather than using annual data, which may obfuscate short term effects
1For an account, see http://www.courant.com/politics/hc-malloy-hiring-freeze-state-agencies-20141113-
story.html (accessed 3/6/17).
2See http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/rick-scott-vetoes-include-election-year-projects-119443
(accessed 3/6/17) or http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/gov-rick-scott-signs-state-budget-
in-private-with-little-notice/2234704 (accessed 3/6/17).
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such as differential outcomes before and after elections (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004;
Labonne, 2016), I use quarterly data that are broad in geographic coverage and span a 27
year period.
In the period leading up to and including the election quarter, state government
employment is higher by up to about 7 state government employees per 100 thousand
capita. By one or two quarters following the election, employment per capita returns to
normal levels. This is precisely what we might expect if incumbent governors attempted
to increase state government employment before an election or allowed it to build up by
delaying any unpopular employment reducing decisions until afterwards. These findings
are confirmed by both the fixed effects and the county-pair approaches, and hold up to a
wide range of robustness and placebo tests. Given the average state population is around
6.5 million (similar to that of, say, Indiana), the magnitude of the effect could be substantial
relative to other election related costs and, moreover, it is likely to be politically important –
in the heated media environment leading up to an election, negative stories can damage a
candidate’s chances (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Soroka et al., 2015).
Local government employment also exhibits electoral cycles, increasing by up to
about 13 employees per 100 thousand in the quarters before an election and, like state
government employment, abruptly returning to normal levels afterwards. This is quite
surprising given that local government employment is more removed from the governor’s
control than state government employment. Even so, the governor may still have the
incentive and means to influence local government employment, provided that local officials
and politicians are cooperative. With state government employment, no such provision
is necessary. Several heterogeneity tests support this explanation – local government
5
employment cycles are weaker in situations where there is likely less local support for the
incumbent, such as when the election is close, the incumbent term limited, or local citizens
tend to vote against the incumbent’s party, while for state government these factors do not
matter.
Disaggregating government employment by subcategory, there is evidence that the
justice, public order and safety subcategory, which includes law enforcement, corrections
and court workers, plays a role in the effects observed. Education, on the other hand,
does not appear to exhibit cycles. I also investigate federal government and private sector
employment. Federal government, as expected, is not influenced. The results for the private
sector are mixed.
Despite the importance of US gubernatorial elections and their suitability for study,
the link between gubernatorial elections and government employment dynamics has been
largely, surprisingly, overlooked by the literature. Besley and Case (2003) conduct a cursory
analysis but do not find effects of gubernatorial elections on unemployment or income.
Levitt (1997) shows that police employment in 59 large cities is higher during mayoral
and gubernatorial election years, and Bee and Moulton (2015) find some evidence that
municipalities have higher local government employment growth during mayoral election
years.
Because of mixed early evidence for cycles in developed economies, attention
shifted to developing countries and young democracies, where political cycles are believed
to be more prevalent (Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Hanusch and
Keefer, 2014). Notable studies include Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), who investigate
Russian budget cycles, and Labonne (2016), perhaps the closest to my paper in terms of
6
the manipulation-related hypotheses investigated. He finds evidence of employment cycles
in Philippine municipalities – employment is higher leading up to elections and lower
afterwards, and the effect is stronger in the private rather than the public sector (I find the
opposite in the US).
In studying the US, by contrast, I contribute to a small but growing literature on
developed economies using modern methods and more comprehensive data, showing that,
in fact, electoral cycles often persist despite economic and institutional maturity. The
most closely related investigate employment outcomes: in Greek municipalities there is
a pre-election increase in contract employees; there is higher public sector employment
in Swedish and Finnish municipalities; in Germany, the timing of hiring new public
school teachers is influenced by electoral motives, and labor market policies reducing
unemployment are pushed before elections (Chortareas et al., 2016; Dahlberg and Mo¨rk,
2011; Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009; Mechtel and Potrafke, 2013).3
Unlike most studies of electoral cycles, especially in the US, I find cycles in a
real economic outcome, public sector employment, rather than a policy instrument. The
idea that direct policy instruments are more manipulable than real economic outcomes led
researchers early on to deem it “more promising to focus empirical research for electoral
cycles on taxes, transfers and government consumption” (Rogoff, 1990: 33) and most
research since has followed this line of reasoning. Studying outcomes rather than policy
instruments may be desirable in cases where the outcome can be manipulated through
3In German states or municipalities, Foremny and Riedel (2014) and Garmann (2017) study non-
employment variables including business tax rates and issuing of building licenses; Aidt et al. (2011) study
various fiscal variables in Portuguese municipalities. US studies focusing on non-employment variables
include: Reynolds (2014), who studies tuition levels in public institutions; Sørensen et al. (2001), who find
that states accumulate smaller surpluses in election years during economic upturns but not during downturns;
and Rose (2006), who examines how business cycles in fiscal variables depend on balanced budget rules.
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multiple channels simultaneously or selectively depending on the circumstances (e.g.,
through timing the use of executive authority, or through influencing the budget well before
the election), or when cycles in policy variables that do not affect outcomes are of less
consequence.
The heterogeneity tests are suggestive of channels through which manipulation
may operate and add to our understanding of the effects of strategic interactions between
different tiers of government. The distributive politics literature investigates how higher
levels of government funnel funds towards aligned lower level government entities (e.g.,
Larcinese et al., 2006; Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008), but less attention is paid to
how local governments behave, or what they do in exchange. When they do touch on this,
it is often to see whether turnout and vote shares respond to receipt of funds (Ansolabehere
and Snyder, 2006). My results suggest a new way local governments may “earn” such
benefits – by influencing local government employment.
While gubernatorial elections are state-level events, by using county-level data,
I am also able to investigate spatial heterogeneity in the incidence of electoral cycles
within a state – are effects concentrated in, e.g., counties more ideologically aligned with
the incumbent? Previous studies largely investigate heterogeneities at the level of the
jurisdiction of the elections considered, e.g., across states when studying gubernatorial
elections (Rose, 2006; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Foremny and Riedel, 2014). Only a few
investigate how the effects at the aggregate level are distributed within those jurisdictions
(e.g., Reynolds, 2014).4
4This is also related to the broad literature on distributive politics, however, most of these studies involve
a limited number of elections at the higher level, e.g., presidential elections (Larcinese et al., 2006; Kim et al.,
2012). These settings, while conceptually similar, come with many empirical tradeoffs.
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Finally, many previous studies use more traditional panel models. Recently, discon-
tinuities at political and administrative boundaries have been exploited as a clean source of
identification.5 To my knowledge, the border discontinuity approach has not previously
been applied to political cycles, a setting for which it is quite well-suited.
1.2 Research design
1.2.1 Institutional setting
Each state’s executive branch is headed by a governor, whose powers generally
include appointing officials and judges, drafting budgets, making legislative proposals, and
vetoing state legislature bills. Governors thus have significant influence over the direction
of the state budget and policy environment. These powers may also allow the governor to
circumvent the state legislature – in the two opening examples, for instance, Dannel Malloy
used his executive authority to impose the hiring freeze on state agencies, while Rick Scott
vetoed spending already approved by the legislature.
Governors are elected to four year terms (except New Hampshire and Vermont,
where terms are two years). Elections take place in November and every year the governor-
ship is up for election in a subset of the states. Figure 1.1 displays the variation in timing
across states: 36 states hold their gubernatorial elections in midterm years; 9 have them in
presidential election years; and, 5 in odd numbered years. Incumbents cannot chose when
5Studies focus on how labor regulations, tax incentives, environmental regulations, and energy prices
affect business location decisions, especially of manufacturing firms (Holmes, 1998; Kahn, 2004; Chirinko
and Wilson, 2008; Duranton et al., 2011; Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Rohlin et al., 2014). The employment
effects of minimum wages (Dube et al., 2010) and spillovers of tax and fiscal policy are also studied (Chirinko
and Wilson, 2008; Peltzman, 2016).
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elections take place.6 Rather, these election schedules have been historically fixed for some
time, with few changes in the past 50 years.7 Since election schedules are well established,
and generally require an amendment to the state constitution to change, they are unlikely to
be related to the variation in employment during my sample period.
The governorship is not identical in each state, but US states are certainly more
comparable than the national governments considered in cross-country studies (Alesina
and Roubini, 1992; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Potrafke, 2010, 2012; Annen and Strickland,
2017). Static state-specific features of the governorship will largely be controlled for by
fixed effects. The other immediate concern is other simultaneous elections – presidential,
congressional, local. This is discussed in the next section.
6In extraordinary circumstances special elections and recall elections are possible. In these cases, the
winner finishes the current term – a new election will still be held according to the state’s fixed schedule. There
were three special election during my sample period: Utah in 2010 (incumbent resigned due to promotion),
West Virginia in 2011 (incumbent died), and Oregon in 2016 (incumbent resigned due to scandal). Dropping
these elections does not affect inferences. There were two recall elections, California 2003 and Wisconsin
2012, which are dropped because their occurrence was unusual and highly related to economic conditions
(recall elections can be triggered by petition when enough signatures are collected in a certain amount of
time), though this also does not affect inferences.
7There was only one change during my sample period of 1990-2015, when Rhode Island switched from
two-year to four-year terms in 1994. The only other change in term length since the 70s was Arkansas in 1986,
also a switch from two- to four-year terms. The three most recent changes in election timing, as opposed
to term length, were Illinois in 1976, Louisiana in 1975 and Florida in 1964. Illinois and Florida switched
from presidential election years to midterm years. Louisiana moved its elections back one year relative to
presidential elections – previously they were concurrent.
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1.2.2 Empirical strategy
I use two complementary empirical strategies, each one offering advantages and
caveats. In the first approach, I run fixed effect regressions of the following general form:
Ycsqt =
3
∑
k=−3
βk · (Elec+k)sqt + γ′ ·Xcqt +αcq+λqt + εcsqt , (1.1)
where c, s, q, and t refer to county, state, quarter and year. The variable (Elec+k)sqt is a
dummy variable equal to one if the current quarter is k quarters after (before, if k is negative)
an election quarter. To better align with the timing of elections, which almost always take
place in November, the definition of a quarter is shifted forward by one month, i.e., the
quarters are February-April, May-July, August-October, and November-January.8
The dependent variable, Ycsqt , is employment per capita in the employment category
of interest, in line with the preferred specifications in previous studies (Dahlberg and Mo¨rk,
2011; Labonne, 2016).9 The coefficients of interest are βk, interpreted as the difference in
employment per capita when there is an election compared to when there is no election.
The coefficient estimates reported are multiplied by 100 thousand for a simple per 100
thousand capita interpretation. I cluster the standard errors at the state level to account for
8By using a seven quarter window around the election, there is the possibility of overlap in the windows
for different states, particularly if their elections are one year apart. The results are not sensitive to dropping
states with elections in odd years to eliminate overlap (see Section 1.7.2). I also consider longer election
windows in Section 1.7.3.
9In Section 1.7.2 I also consider using the quarter-to-quarter growth rate in employment or the log level
of employment as the dependent variable. One might also consider a lagged dependent variable on the right
hand side. I do not do so because the election cycles are fixed and exogenous. Including lagged dependent
variables in a fixed effect model also results in bias (Nickell, 1981), though the bias disappears asymptotically
in long panels. In any case, I show in Section 1.7.2 that including a lagged dependent variable does not
change inferences.
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serial correlation and the fact that the election variable is constant within a state.10
The vector Xcqt , included in some specifications, contains time invariant county
characteristics interacted with linear and quadratic time trends. The included characteristics
are: an urban dummy, equal to one if the county belongs to a Metropolitan Statistical area
of 250,000 or more residents; dummies for the electoral cycle (whether the state holds
elections in presidential, midterm, or off-years); and, baseline (first quarter 1990) values of
log income per capita, log of population, fraction of private sector employment in goods
producing industries as opposed to services industries.11 This helps control for long term
trends affecting different types of counties, for example, the gradual decline experienced by
manufacturing industries. Contemporaneous or lagged values are not used because: first,
contemporaneous values may also be affected by elections; second, there may be reverse
causality if, say, lower employment causes lower income.12 As an even more saturated
specification, I also consider interacting the time invariant county characteristics (dummies
for above or below the median in the case of continuous variables) with the year-quarter
effects.
County-quarter fixed effects, αcq, are always included to control for county-specific
seasonal trends and time invariant county characteristics. Unless they are subsumed by other
fixed effects, year-quarter effects, λqt , control for common shocks in different time periods.
10I focus on the county level because, first, I explore spatial heterogeneity across counties and, second,
the subsequently discussed county-pair approach relies on the use of county-level data. By clustering at the
state level, I allow arbitrary correlations across counties in a state. County level controls can also improve the
precision of the estimates (Foremny and Riedel, 2014). In any case, the results are robust to aggregating to
the state level – see Section 1.7.2. I work at the quarterly level rather than the monthly level since it is less
noisy and aids in the presentation of the tables, but the results are not sensitive to the aggregation scheme
(Section 1.7.2).
11Goods producing refers to NAICS sectors 11-33 and includes natural resources, mining, construction
and manufacturing. Service providing refers to all remaining sectors: NAICS sectors 42-99.
12Inferences are robust to using contemporaneous values of the control variables – see Section 1.7.2.
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The year-quarter fixed effects also help control for simultaneous federal elections – i.e.,
presidential and House elections. Senate elections do not all occur at once and, in Section
1.7.5, I incorporate them into my analysis. Local elections, e.g., mayoral or city council
elections, are another potential omitted variable. First, I believe it is reasonable to assume
that these elections tend to be less important than gubernatorial elections, and should not
confound the results in a systematic way, though I concede it is possible. Second, cycles
are observed in both state and local government employment. While co-timed mayoral
elections could contribute to cycles in local government employment, this is less likely for
state employment.13
To help control for spatial heterogeneity across the US, in some specifications I
include census division linear and quadratic time trends or census division-year-quarter
fixed effects. This controls for divergent long-term employment trends in different parts
of the country driven by, for example, large scale migration from the Rust Belt states to
the western and southern states. Even including these fairly flexible controls, however,
substantial spatial heterogeneity can be problematic in traditional fixed effects models
run at the national level (Dube et. al, 2010). The implicit assumption is that any county
in the country is a suitable control for any other, which in many cases is unlikely to be
true. Therefore, I also follow Dube et al. (2010) who, studying the employment effects of
minimum wages, implement a geographic discontinuity design that compares employment
within pairs of counties that straddle a state border and are generally similar, belonging to
the same local market and experiencing similar economic fluctuations.
13The mayoral elections dataset of Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), graciously provided by the authors, regis-
ters 3464 mayoral elections in 886 cities between 1990 and 2007. Of these mayoral elections, approximately
18% were held in the same year that a gubernatorial election was held in the state, indicating a moderate
preference for holding mayoral elections in non-gubernatorial election years in this sample of cities.
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The specification takes the following form:
Yc jsqt =
3
∑
k=−3
βk · (Elec+k)sqt + γ′ ·Xcqt +αcq+pi jqt + εc jsqt , (1.2)
where j now indexes county-pair. A county-pair is a pair of two contiguous counties in
different states. Since a county may be paired with more than one county in the bordering
state, I include each county as many times as it can be matched to another contiguous county
across the border, so that the same county may appear multiple times in the regression.
To guard against mechanical correlation induced by including duplicate counties along a
border segment (pair of adjacent states), I cluster the standard errors both at the state level
and at the border segment level.14 County-pair-year-quarter fixed effects, pi jqt , control for
economic conditions at the very local level, using within county-pair variation in electoral
cycles to identify the effect of an election on employment rates.
The county-pair approach offers a clean identification strategy that controls for
very local economic conditions, avoiding many of the pitfalls associated with the panel
specifications. This strategy is not foolproof (Neumark et al. 2013). Counties at state
borders may not be as similar as we would imagine, and border areas may be subject to
different dynamics or spillovers across states. Although private sector firms may shift their
activities across borders to escape unfavorable conditions (Holmes, 1998; Kahn, 2004;
Kahn and Mansur, 2013), I expect this to be less of an issue with government employment,
where jobs are often state specific.15 There is also a practical issue – focusing on border
14Counties with more pairs also implicitly receive unequal weight in the regression. The results are not
sensitive to weighting each county by the inverse of the number of pairs in which it appears (Section 1.7.2).
15E.g., police officer training is naturally specific to state laws and officers are generally not allowed to
work in other states unless the move is permanent and they undergo a relicensing procedure. In Texas, for
example, to transfer from another state one must submit an application, pass a number of examinations, make
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counties reduces sample size. The two methods thus complement each other, and it is
comforting that the results are similar using either.
1.2.3 Data
Employment data come from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which provides monthly employment
counts at the county level, from 1990 until the first quarter of 2017. The underlying data
are derived from quarterly Unemployment Insurance contribution reports that are required
to be filed by 97% of wage and salary civilian employers. The main exclusions are the
self-employed, some agricultural categories, and the armed forces. In the first quarter of
2017, the QCEW recorded, 14.3 million local government employees, 4.6 million state
government employees, and 119.8 million private sector employees in the US (the aggregate
trends are shown in Figure 1.3 in Appendix 1.6).
The main categories of both state and local government employment are education,
law enforcement and corrections, hospitals and health, judicial and legal, public adminis-
tration, and others. There are some categories that are always state or always local (e.g.,
firefighters are local government employees) and, within a category, there are differences
between who is a local and who is a state employee (in education, elementary and secondary
school teachers are generally local government employees, workers in public universities
are usually state employees, and for community college workers it varies). Elected officials,
members of a legislative body and members of the judiciary are excluded from the QCEW,
up for any lacking basic training, among other paperwork. See https://www.tcole.texas.gov/content/out-state-
peace-officers (accessed 3/6/17).
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as well as the vast majority of poll workers who help supervise elections.16 In Section 1.3.3,
despite data limitations, I attempt to disaggregate by government employment subcategories
and, in Section 1.3.4, I consider federal government employment and a number of private
sector industries, including manufacturing and construction.
Population and income data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis17 and the
urban/rural dummy comes from a classification by the National Council for Health Statistics.
The cross sectional variables used in Section 1.3.3 come from the 2000 census. Data on
election outcomes are primarily from David Leip’s Atlas on US Presidential elections and
sources such as individual state agency websites. My main sample covers 1321 state-years,
in 359 of which there were gubernatorial elections.
The main sample for the fixed effects analysis is constructed as follows. Starting
from the 3143 county equivalents in the US, I exclude those with missing data for the
variables considered and those that were affected by boundary changes and could not be
matched across datasets. One complication is that the BLS suppresses employment data
for some counties out of confidentiality concerns. I exclude all counties with suppressed
data during my sample period.18 It can also happen that changes in QCEW employment
numbers are due to reclassification of establishment industries, i.e., administrative rather
than real economic changes. While the BLS attempts to account for this, some implausible
16Those that earn less than $1000 per annum are not covered in the definition of employment for state
Unemployment Insurance purposes (Title 26, United States Code §3309(b)(3)(F), 2010). There are multiple
additional reasons to believe the results are not driven by poll workers, discussed in detail in Section 1.7.4.
17These data are annual and, hence, I impute missing values within years using linear interpolation.
18The Bureau of Economic Analysis, for statistical purposes, sometimes combines several county equiva-
lents into one statistical area. This occurs predominantly in Virginia, where small independent cities are often
combined with a larger neighboring county. Where possible, I aggregated the QCEW employment data for
counties within a statistical area so that they could be matched across datasets – thus, a few of my “counties”
consist of more than one county equivalent area.
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changes remain, though there is no reason to believe these anomalies are related to elections.
To consistently lessen the impact of such administrative changes, I exclude counties whose
maximum (minimum) change in quarter-to-quarter employment per capita is in the top or
bottom 1%.19
My final sample consists of 1751 counties, with a combined population of about
236 million in 2016, or about 73% of the total US population of 323.1 million (US Census
Bureau). In terms of the workforce, in the first quarter of 2017, my sample includes a
total of 10.4, 3.3 and 85.4 million local government, state government, and private sector
employees out of the 14.3, 4.6, and 119.8 million recorded by the QCEW, or about 71-73%
coverage. Summary statistics are in Table 1.7, and the counties included are shown in
Figure 1.4.20 For the county-pair sample, I start from 1069 counties that are contiguous
to another state and proceed as above, only that now I exclude pairs where either county
is excluded according to the above criteria. I end up with 500 counties, from which 430
county-pairs can be formed at 71 border segments (pairs of adjacent states). Summary
statistics are in Table 1.8 and the included counties are shown in Figure 1.5.21
19There remain some large, though plausible, outliers. In Section 1.7.7, I check the robustness of the
results to a more stringent criterion for excluding outliers.
20The missing counties are often sparsely populated counties in the West, with the notable exception of
most of Illinois, Michigan and Tennessee, which are excluded mainly due to suppressed state government
figures. Since there are more local government employees than state, coverage of the former variable tends to
be better, and in Section 1.7.7 I check whether the results for local government continue to hold on a larger
sample that only requires that counties have local government figures, rather than both local and state.
21Out of 71 border segments: 31 have the same election cycle; for 22, the two states have elections that are
two years apart; for 15, one state leads the other by one year (so that elections are one or three years apart);
and, for 3 segments, one state has two year cycles and the other has four year cycles, so that their elections
coincide in presidential election years but not midterm years.
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1.3 Results
1.3.1 State government employment
Table 1.1 presents the main results for state government employment using the
fixed effects (columns 1-3) and county-pair approaches (columns 4-7). The coefficient
estimates, as they are multiplied by 100 thousand, can be interpreted as the additional
employees per 100 thousand capita (the average county in my sample has a population of
about 120 thousand). The coefficient estimates corresponding to columns (2) and (5) are
graphed against the number of quarters to the election in the top panel of Figure 1.2. The
specification in column (1) includes only the main independent variables of interest, in
addition to county-quarter and year-quarter fixed effects. Column (2) incorporates linear
and quadratic time trends for each of the nine census divisions and time invariant control
variables interacted with linear and quadratic time trends. Column (3) includes census
division-year-quarter fixed effects and interacts the time invariant county characteristics (for
continuous variables, a dummy for above or below the median value) with the year-quarter
fixed effects. In this specification, I retain the electoral cycle dummies interacted with
linear and quadratic time trends from column (2), since interacting these variables with
year-quarter effects would sweep out all of the identifying variation.
All three fixed effects specifications indicate that state government employment
per capita is higher in counties that have a gubernatorial election coming up than in
counties that do not. In column (1), which essentially compares means net of county-
quarter and year-quarter fixed effects, the estimates are large in magnitude and highly
statistically significant. When further control variables are incorporated, the estimates
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decrease somewhat in magnitude, remaining statistically significant at lower levels. After
the election, the effects drop off rapidly – by the quarter Elec+2 the effect is no longer
statistically significant in any specification. The estimated coefficient (column 2) peaks at
about 7 additional state government employees per 100 thousand capita in the quarter of
the election.22
In columns (4)-(7), the pattern of higher state government employment leading
up to elections reappears in the county-pair regressions. Column (4) includes county-
quarter and pair-year-quarter fixed effects. Column (5) includes controls interacted with
linear and quadratic time trends (except census division time trends as local trends are
already captured by the pair-year-quarter effects). Column (6) replaces these time trends
with dummy variables interacted with time fixed effects (similar to column 3). Since
moving to the county-pair method involves a change in sample, column (7) runs a fixed
effects regression on the sample of border counties, using the column (2) specification.
The coefficient estimates indicate that employment is higher by up to about 8 employees
(column 5) per 100,000 before elections – though the effects do appear to dissipate earlier
than using the fixed effects approach.
These patterns of heightened state government employment leading up to elections
are consistent with the manipulation hypothesis. Moreover, given the typical county is
quite small – the average state has about 63 counties (alternatively, the typical state is
similar in population to Indiana, with about 6.5 million residents) – these effects may
quickly become economically and politically substantial. One can make a rough back-of-
the-envelope calculation of the additional costs implied. In 2016 the average weekly wage
22The R2 values are high because the large baseline differences in employment across different counties,
which are explained by the county-quarter fixed effects, dwarf the fluctuations over time for a given county.
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of a state government employee in the counties in my sample was $853 in 2016 dollars
(QCEW). Assuming any additional employees receive the average wage, the cost based on
the coefficient estimates for Elec-2 through Elec+1 is about $260,000 per 100 thousand
capita, or $2.60 per person. While this does not seem not enormous in absolute terms, it is
large compared to other relevant costs. Comprehensive national data on the costs of holding
elections is lacking but, e.g., the 2014 general elections cost Colorado counties about $12.2
million, or $2.30 per capita.23 There are also fixed costs. Secure electronic voting systems
have become a salient issue following the 2016 general elections, but they are expensive
and some governments struggle to afford them. In 2018, California governor Jerry Brown
proposed $134 million – about $3.40 per capita and half of the amount needed statewide –
to upgrade outdated voting equipment.24 Also in 2018, Pennsylvania governor Tom Wolf
told counties that he wanted them to replace their electronic voting systems before 2020.
However, counties warned of a lack of funds, estimating a price tag of up to $125 million,
or about $10 per capita.25
The effects are very short term in nature, consistent with several explanations. The
most conventional is that voters are often myopic and take into account only very recent
events. What drives this myopia is a matter of debate. Healy and Lenz (2014) find that
while voters intend to judge incumbents based on their performance for their whole term,
information on cumulative outcomes lacking, so they heuristically use recent conditions
23Obtained from the Accountability in Colorado Elections interactive tool from the Colorado Secretary
of State: http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/ACE/ElectionCostStatistics/atlas.html?indicator2=i0&
date2=Gross\%20Cost (accessed 7/7/18).
24See, for example, the following article: http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-budget-
brown-proposed-20180111-htmlstory.html (accessed 7/7/18).
25See https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/pennsylvania/articles/2018-04-12/pennsylvania-asks-
counties-to-replace-voting-systems-by-2020 (accessed 7/7/18).
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as a substitute. Also, media coverage of the economy may be different before and after
elections, in both volume and in tone (Soroka et al., 2015). Wlezien (2015) argues that
voters care fairly equally about things that happened long ago and recently, which still
leaves an incentive for incumbents to induce short term cycles. Short term effects are also
consistent with previous findings (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Labonne, 2016).
From the perspective of the incumbent governor, there is also an incentive to, rather
than just increase employment to win additional votes, avoid negative publicity before
elections. With heightened attention from journalists and political opponents, even a small
reduction in hiring could be broadcast in a negative light to the public and have electoral
repercussions (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Thus, the incumbent would have an incentive to
allow hiring to accumulate excessively during the campaign period with an eye to delaying
hard decisions until afterwards, especially if media coverage responds more to changes
than to overall levels (Soroka et al., 2015). This explanation is consistent with the anecdotal
evidence (see Introduction) and other findings in the literature (Foremny and Riedel, 2014).
Going forward, I choose the specifications in columns (2) and (5) of Tables 1.1
as the preferred specifications – they offer a reasonable balance between controlling for
heterogeneous time trends and eliminating too much of the variation – I will often present
results for these specifications only to save space. In Section 1.7.2, I show the results are
robust to a range of plausible alternative specifications besides the three considered so far.
1.3.2 Local government employment
Theoretically, state government employment is more likely to exhibit electoral
cycles than local government employment, e.g., at the municipal or county level, because it
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is more within the influence of the governor. On the other hand, there may be both incentives
and means for the governor to affect local government employment, especially when local
governments officials or politicians (mayors, city counselors, county commissioners, etc.)
are ideologically aligned or have an incentive to cooperate. Higher level governments
have been shown to channel grants towards ideologically aligned lower level governments
(Larcinese et al., 2006; Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). Less work has been done on
how lower level governments may respond to or “earn” this favoritism (except Ansolabehere
and Snyder, 2006, who show that aligned local governments that received more grants had
higher turnout in subsequent elections). It could be that another channel through which local
governments respond to such benefits is through influencing local government employment.
Table 1.2 provides evidence that cycles in local government employment are ob-
served using both the fixed effects (columns 1-3) and the county-pair approach (columns
4-7), and the coefficient estimates corresponding to columns (2) and (5) are graphed in the
bottom panel of Figure 1.2. The results indicate that local government employment per
capita is higher in counties that have a gubernatorial election coming up than in counties
that do not, peaking at 13 employees per 100,000 capita for the fixed effects specifications
and 17 for the county-pair specifications. After the election, the effects again drop off
rapidly – the coefficient estimate for the quarter following the election quarter, Elec+1, is
already statistically insignificant in all specifications.
The pattern is, as in the case of state government employment, consistent with the
manipulation hypothesis. The financial cost is roughly $3.70 per person, again a substantial
amount.26
26Based on an average weekly wage in 2016 of a local government employee in the counties in my sample
of $728 in 2016 dollars, and the coefficient estimates for Elec-3 through Elec. The somewhat surprising
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1.3.3 Heterogeneity
Electoral cycles may vary depending on the institutional or political setting and
spatially across counties within a state. Effects may also be driven by certain categories
of government employees. Studying heterogeneity may be useful in understanding the
mechanisms at play. I restrict attention to the fixed effects specifications, since in the county-
pair specification identifying variation may be coming from too few border segments27 and
data limitations are restrictive when disaggregating by subcategory.
Political and institutional heterogeneity
I first include interactions to test for differences across political settings. A compli-
cation when working with interactions is that sometimes they are clearly not exogenous to
local economic conditions, e.g., elections are more likely to be close if recent economic
conditions have been poor, and there are large baseline differences in employment between
counties in states with close elections compared to those in states without. To better account
for these large baseline differences, I include in such cases the one-year lagged dependent
variable to control for recent economic conditions.28 The results including interaction
effects are shown in Table 1.3, while the (equivalent) marginal effects are plotted in Figures
1.6-1.7 (further heterogeneity tests are considered in Section 1.7.1 of the Appendix).
finding of local government employment cycles is investigated further in the next section, where several
heterogeneity analyses provide suggestive evidence in favor of the explanation proposed above.
27For example, to estimate separate effects of elections when the incumbent is or is not term limited, I
need to compare states that have an election with a term limited incumbent to states with no elections, and
compare states with non-term limited incumbents with states without elections, drastically reducing statistical
power because in the county-pair approach the comparison additionally needs to be across contiguous states.
28In the main regressions I did not, mainly because the election cycles themselves are fixed and exogenous
to local economic conditions (although the main results are robust to the inclusion of lagged dependent
variables, see Section 1.7.2).
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When an election is competitive, it is possible that incumbents have greater incen-
tives to raise employment, since small changes could be decisive. I split the sample based
on whether or not the election is close (having a winning margin of 5% or less). Columns
(1)-(2) of Table 1.3 (Figure 1.6) show the results. For state government employment, cycles
are present whether the election is close or not. For local government employment, the
pre-electoral increase in employment is mainly driven by non-close elections, while for
close elections the pre-electoral increase is not significant. In the post-election quarters,
there is a negative and significant decrease in local government employment for close
elections, but no decrease for non-close elections (and the difference between the effects
for close and non-close elections is statistically significant). These findings are consistent
with the idea that in both close and non-close elections the governor has similar levels
of influence over economic policy at the state level. The governor’s influence over local
governments, however, is less direct. When elections are close there are likely lower levels
of support and political capital at the local level, making it more difficult for the governor
to affect local government employment.
Term limits are fixed by law in many states. Incentives for governors to manipulate
may be lower when they are not eligible for another term (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Besley
and Case, 1995), though empirical evidence is mixed (Rose, 2006). For government
employment, I find that term limits matter at the local level but not the state level. Columns
(3)-(4) of Table 1.3 (Figure 1.6) show that: for state government employment, term limits
do not matter and cycles are present in both cases; for local government employment, cycles
are driven by elections where the incumbent is not term limited, and are absent when the
incumbent is term limited (and the differences between the effects for term limited and
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non-term limited elections are statistically significant for most quarters). It could be that
local government is less manipulable either because the incumbent is a lame-duck governor,
unable to offer future benefits in exchange for local support, or because open elections are
associated with greater political competition. With state government employment, again,
the governor has more direct influence and does not need to rely on local officials.
A county’s ideological alignment with the incumbent governor may be important,
especially as a determinant of local government employment cycles: politically aligned
local officials (proxied by the alignment of the county’s voters), may coordinate or cooperate
with the governor’s office; local officials in unaligned counties, on the other hand, may
be less facilitating. I categorize counties as strongly Republican if they are in the top
quartile of their state in terms of average Republican vote share, and strongly Democratic if
they are in the bottom quartile. I create an alignment variable equal to 1 if the incumbent
governor and the county are aligned (e.g., there is a Republican incumbent and the county
is classified as strongly Republican), -1 if the incumbent and the county are unaligned (e.g.,
Republican incumbent and strongly Democratic county), and zero otherwise. I interact
this variable with the election dummy variables to test for a differential effect of elections
in more aligned counties (columns 5-6 of Table 1.3, Figure 1.7). For state government
employment, alignment does not appear to matter. For local government, the differential
effect of alignment is positive and statistically significant in the quarters Elec and Elec+1.
These findings are consistent with the idea that the incumbent relies on local politician
support to affect local government employment, but is able to influence state government
employment more directly.
In columns (7) and (8) of Table 1.3 (Figure 1.7), I consider whether the incumbent
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state legislature is ideologically aligned with the incumbent governor. When both branches
of power are controlled by the same party, it may be substantially easier to implement
policies affecting public sector employment (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Bjørnskov and Potrafke,
2013).29 The results suggest that this is the case. For both state and local government
employment, the pattern of increased employment leading up to elections appears more
prominent when the state legislature is aligned with the incumbent, although we cannot in
most cases reject that the effect is the same in both cases.
Next, I investigate partisan affiliation of the incumbent governor.30 According
to the partisan theories, left-wing governments prefer to implement more expansionary
policies, while right-wing governments are more fiscally conservative (Chappell and Keech,
1986; for a survey, see Potrafke, 2018). At the same time, government employees in the
United States tend to lean Democratic, which may make manipulation more important for
Democratic incumbents compared to Republicans, who rely less on public sector votes.
State government employees, especially, tend to lead Democratic.31 The results in columns
(9)-(10) of Table 1.3 (Figure 1.6) are consistent with these arguments. For state government
employment, we observe cycles for both Republicans and Democrats, but the pattern is
more pronounced in the lead up to elections under Democrats. For local government
employment, cycles are present for both Democratic and Republican incumbents, but
29There are, of course, alternative possibilities. First, alignment also suggests that one party dominates
state politics, so re-election incentives may be weaker; second, state legislators are also incumbents with
re-election incentives – even if poor economic conditions are detrimental to the incumbent governor’s chances,
it is not clear that incumbent legislators benefit at the governor’s expense; third, governors in some cases are
able to circumvent the state legislature through executive actions or vetoes.
30Elections with independent incumbents are very few and are dropped.
31According to a 2010 Gallup poll, 46.1% of unionized state government employees identified as Demo-
cratic versus 23.7% as Republican (39.2% vs. 29.5% if non-unionized). For local government employment,
the gaps were smaller: 40.6% vs. 26.6% for unionized and 33.7% vs 32.7% for non-unionized workers. See
http://news.gallup.com/poll/146786/democrats-lead-ranks-union-state-workers.aspx (accessed 11/13/17).
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are more pronounced under Democrats (significantly so for the quarter Elec+1), and the
pre-electoral increase in employment is not statistically different from zero for Republicans.
Institutional differences in state budgeting processes may influence cycles. States
have budget rules with different levels of stringency, based on whether balanced budget
provisions affect the enactment or the execution of the state budget (Clemens and Miran,
2012). Rules of the former type require only that the state legislature pass a balanced budget
(in expectation), while the latter type restricts carrying (actual) deficits through to the next
year – any deficit is deducted from next year’s revenue. Following Clemens and Miran
(2012), I define 19 states as having strict balanced budget rules.32 Since opportunistic
manipulation of public sector employment puts pressure on the state budget, it may be
limited in magnitude in states with strict balanced budget laws or, if not, we may observe
post-election cuts since any deficit should be eliminated before the end of the budget cycle
(Rose, 2006). Fiscal years typically start on July 1, so that in a state with an annual budget
cycle, any “unexpected” deficit incurred due to manipulation should be eliminated within
8 months following the election. For states with less stringent budget laws or non-annual
budget cycles, such post-election cuts should be less expedient.33
The results are shown in columns (11)-(12) of Table 1.3 (Figure 1.6). For state
government employment, employment contradictorily increases more in states with strict
rules, although the differences do not turn out to be statistically significant. For local
32States are scored on the stringency of budget rules in a 1987 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) report. Strict balanced budget states are those with scores of 7 or more on the ACIR’s 1-10
scale and with annual budgetary and legislative cycles (some states have strict rules but their budget cycles
last more than one year, in which case we expect that any post-election cuts required to balance the budget
are less immediately expedient). The strict balanced budget states are AL, AZ, CO, DE, GA, ID, IA, KS, MS,
MO, NJ, NM, OK, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT and WV.
33However, Boylan (2008) shows how state governments use overly optimistic revenue forecasts to
circumvent balanced budget requirements, and increase spending prior to elections.
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government employment, in states with strict balanced budget rules, the pre-electoral
increase and post-electoral decrease do not attain statistical significance. The effects for
Elec and Elec+1 are significantly lower in states with stringent rules compared to states
with lenient rules, consistent with a more urgent need to balance the budget in strict states
(Rose, 2006).
Government employment subcategories
It would be desirable to know which employees exactly may be subject to the effects
observed previously. Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow for a comprehensive
analysis, as the data suppression issue becomes much more severe as we disaggregate to
lower level employment categories. I am, however, able to investigate a few particularly
important categories in this section, albeit with much reduced sample sizes.34 I also explain
why an alternative explanation, that the results are driven by poll workers, is very unlikely.
I consider public administration and education. Public administration includes
a wide range of employees: law enforcement and fire protection, courts, public finance
activities, government offices, administration of education, human resources, economic and
environmental programs, among others. Education consists largely of schoolteachers at the
local level and universities at the state level, while other institutions such as community
colleges may be either state or local. Within public administration, I also look at the
subcategory of justice, public order and safety employment, which includes law enforcement
officers, firefighters, corrections and court workers. Again there are differences between
34It is only practical to use the fixed effects approach because, of the remaining counties, even fewer are
located at state borders and, of these, still fewer border another county that also does not suffer from data
suppression.
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the local and state levels, e.g., local law enforcement includes municipal police and county
sheriffs’ offices, while at the state level it typically includes highway patrol, transit police,
various state investigative agencies (criminal, regulatory, revenue enforcement, licensing,
etc.), park rangers, departments of homeland security, among others. These are important
categories as, in addition to having comparatively good data coverage, they are perhaps
among the most salient in terms of public good provision as well as coverage in the media.
Regression results are reported in Table 1.4.35
For state government employment (columns 1-3), despite the small sample sizes,
state public administration shows a clear increase in employment in the period leading
up to and including the election quarter (column 1). The coefficient estimates are highly
statistically significant for a full five quarters. A fair portion of this effect appears to
be coming from the justice, public order and safety subcategory, which shows a similar
pattern that also attains high levels of statistical significance (column 3).36 State education
employment does follow the pattern of increased employment leading up to the election,
although the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. One
possible explanation is that there may be other offsetting channels of manipulation – e.g.,
Reynolds (2014) finds electoral cycles in tuition, which could put pressure on university
budgets and prevent hiring.
For local government employment (columns 4-6), the results are inconclusive. Local
public administration does not appear to be impacted. Local education employment is
35Because the number of states represented in the regressions is substantially reduced below conventional
levels, I cluster at the state-by-half of sample level.
36While the effects appear strong in justice, public order and safety, the aggregate effects are not coming
only from this category. Using total state government employment as dependent variable on the smaller
sample (result not reported) gives coefficient estimates of up to 17 employees per 100 thousand capita,
compared to 4-5 employees per 100 thousand capita for justice, public order and safety.
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slightly higher when an election is approaching, but the increase is small and far from
statistically significant. For local justice, public order and safety employment, while we do
not see a pre-electoral increase in employment, we do see a statistically significant drop
in the two quarters following the election, consistent with post-election cuts. The sample
sizes for these three regressions are, however, much reduced, retaining 1324, 856 and 370
counties, respectively, out of the 1751 the main sample.37
Another important government employment category is poll workers – the effects
may simply be due to the workers who supervise polling stations on election day. There
are multiple reasons this is unlikely, detailed in Section 1.7.4 in the Appendix. Most
importantly: the vast majority of poll workers are excluded from the QCEW dataset. Also,
among other reasons, the identification strategy is mostly based on comparing states with
and without gubernatorial elections, but all of which also hold federal elections and, hence,
already hire poll workers. The findings are robust to dropping cases where this is not true.
1.3.4 Federal government and private sector employment
Federal government and private sector employment may behave differently under
the manipulation hypothesis than state and local government employment. The governor is
unlikely to be able to affect private sector firms and federal government agencies as easily.
That said, there may be differences across industries. Construction, for example, may see
increased contracts before elections because of new government infrastructure projects
timed with the elections in mind or increased issuance of building permits (Garmann,
37Indeed, when using aggregate local government employment as the dependent variable, but restricting
to the smaller samples, the pre-electoral increases in employment are still present, but only attain statistical
significance on the 1324 county sample (result not reported).
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2017). Manufacturing firms often play an important role in the local economy, and may
be politically connected or sensitive to policy outcomes (Claessens et al, 2008; Innes and
Mitra, 2015).
At the same time, there is a plausible second channel through which elections
are likely to affect employment – heightened uncertainty about future policies (Bloom,
2009; Baker et al., 2015). In the case of publicly listed firms, elections are associated
with decreased investment – firms find it optimal to adopt a “wait and see” approach to
investment that may be affected by any future changes in policy (Julio and Yook, 2012; Jens,
2017). Indeed, Jens (2017) also studies US gubernatorial elections and finds very large
effects of uncertainty (up to 15% in close elections), and hiring is likely impacted in similar
ways. Thus, policy uncertainty might be predicted to give rise to lower employment prior to
elections, followed by a “rebound” afterwards. Note that these predicted effects would push
in the opposite direction to manipulation effects. Uncertainty could also plausibly apply
to government employment. Although this seems less likely, the estimated manipulation
effects in Section 1.3.1 are likely to be lower bounds.
The results of the fixed effects approach applied to federal government and private
sector employment are shown in Table 1.5. Besides aggregate private sector employment,
I also investigate manufacturing, construction, retail, and professional and business ser-
vices.38 I hypothesize that manufacturing and construction are more likely to be impacted,
while retail and professional and business services are diverse categories and seem less so,
at least through the manipulation channel.
The results show that federal government employment, as expected, does not appear
38Professional and business services broadly include legal, accounting, engineering, administrative,
management and other services.
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to be influenced by gubernatorial elections. Aggregate private sector employment, however,
shows a pattern of higher employment the two quarters prior to an election, by up to 40
employees per county (private sector employment is generally much higher than govern-
ment employment). It appears that both manufacturing and, to some extent, construction
contribute to this pattern (significant at the 10% level). Neither retail nor professional and
business services appear to be affected. These results are consistent with political manipu-
lation in certain sectors before elections through, perhaps, more expansionary economic
policy such as construction projects or through political connections.
The results of the county-pair regressions are shown in Table 1.6. The results are
very similar for federal government and retail employment. Construction and professional
and business services display a similar pattern of coefficient estimates, although in the
former case they are no longer statistically significant at conventional levels, while in the
latter case they now attain statistical significance. The results for aggregate private sector,
however, are not consistent with the results of the fixed effects approach, a discrepancy
that appears to be driven by manufacturing and, to some extent, professional and business
services. In these sectors, manufacturing especially, employment is lower leading up
to elections, at high levels of statistical significance, and in the post-electoral period
employment quickly returns to normal. This pattern is not consistent with manipulation, but
is consistent with the political uncertainty hypothesis, whereby hiring in sensitive industries
is lower on the side of the border with greater uncertainty induced by an upcoming election.
A plausible explanation for the discrepancy between the fixed effects and the
county-pair results for certain sectors is that employment dynamics in border regions may
be very different. Compared to government employment, which is less mobile across state
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boundaries, private sector employment need not be so constrained and spillovers are an
issue. A large literature also shows that firms are more likely to locate on the side of the
border with more favorable policies, which may lead to a higher (or lower) than usual
density of politically sensitive firms at state borders (Holmes, 1998; Kahn, 2004; Kahn and
Mansur, 2013; Rohlin et al., 2014). Thus, while these results are suggestive, and there may
be good reasons why the results of both approaches do not agree, and they should perhaps
be taken more cautiously than the results for local and state government employment.
Future work may look to investigate private sector employment dynamics in more detail.
1.4 Conclusion
Using both fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that zooms
in on county-pairs straddling state borders with different election cycles, I find evidence of
electoral cycles in government employment. Employment tends to increase leading up to
elections, after which it abruptly returns to normal levels. This pattern is consistent with
manipulation that could occur through, e.g., delaying a hiring freeze until after an election,
or more restrained use of veto powers before elections. The magnitude of the effects is
potentially substantial economically and politically. The results are consistent across both
approaches and stand up to a range of additional robustness checks. Heterogeneity is
explored, and several results support the link to manipulation.
These results stand in contrast to early studies that did not find electoral cycles in
real economic outcomes such as employment in the United States (Besley and Case, 2003),
and highlight the importance of considering short time horizons to pick up differential
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effects in the pre- and post-electoral periods (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya, 2004). Given
the attention paid to manipulation in developing countries (Labonne, 2016), showing
evidence of electoral cycles in advanced economies, in particular an economic giant like
the United States, is important, and suggests that electoral cycles are widespread, economic
and institutional development notwithstanding.
Future research should investigate further the channels through which governors
might influence public sector employment, e.g., which policies are most often timed to the
electoral cycle and how this process plays out in the legislative and executive branches.
More needs to be said about the impact on the provision of local public services, which
would provide a better quantification of the overall effects on a region. Related, while
my focus is on relatively short term dynamics, it would also be interesting to assess any
long term effects on the size and composition of state and local government, individual
occupational or migration decisions, and voting decisions in subsequent elections.
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Figure 1.1: Timing of US gubernatorial elections by state.
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Figure 1.2: Coefficient estimates from main regressions. Each figure corresponds to a separate
regression. Corresponds to Tables 1.1-1.2. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1.1: Main results for state government employment using fixed effects and county-pair
approaches. See also Figure 1.2. Further specifications considered in Tables 1.12-1.14.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
State government
Elec-3 4.46 1.10 0.33 3.20 4.20 4.23 6.79∗∗
(3.84) (2.98) (3.37) (6.33) (3.79) (3.83) (3.31)
Elec-2 9.53∗∗ 6.23∗ 5.25 7.15 8.25∗∗ 8.71∗∗ 10.70∗∗∗
(4.23) (3.37) (3.92) (6.44) (3.86) (3.92) (3.40)
Elec-1 10.05∗∗ 6.80∗ 5.99 5.23 6.44∗ 6.65∗ 7.40∗
(4.25) (3.38) (4.03) (5.44) (3.24) (3.47) (3.69)
Elec 10.12∗∗∗ 7.32∗∗∗ 5.72∗ 4.43 5.55 6.10 6.69∗∗
(3.32) (2.19) (2.98) (5.40) (3.47) (3.66) (3.09)
Elec+1 6.48∗∗∗ 4.85∗∗ 3.69 0.75 1.43 0.55 7.26∗∗
(2.41) (2.07) (2.72) (4.38) (3.50) (3.43) (3.26)
Elec+2 3.27 1.64 2.09 -0.19 0.56 -0.49 3.66
(3.35) (3.26) (3.03) (4.71) (3.59) (3.45) (3.54)
Elec+3 0.53 -1.14 0.46 -2.94 -2.13 -3.21 -2.61
(3.66) (3.55) (2.38) (3.45) (2.69) (2.64) (3.39)
N 188880 188880 188880 92880 92880 92880 41820
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95
County·quarter Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year·quarter Y Y Y Y
Pair·year·quarter Y Y Y
Controls·trends Y Y Y
Controls·year·quarter Y Y
CD·year·quarter Y
Columns (1)-(3) based on 1751 counties, 49 states; columns (4)-(7) on 500 counties, 430 county-pairs, 71
border segments, 43 states. Dependent variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors
multiplied by 100 thousand for a per 100 thousand capita interpretation. “CD” refers to census division.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the state level (columns 1-3) or two ways at the state and border
segment level (columns 4-7). ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Table 1.2: Main results for local government employment using fixed effects and county-pair
approaches. See also Figure 1.2. Further specifications considered in Tables 1.12-1.14.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Local government
Elec-3 1.64 7.83∗ 5.30 2.22 6.56 7.41 0.90
(4.23) (4.06) (3.88) (5.45) (5.52) (5.51) (4.46)
Elec-2 1.96 8.19∗∗ 5.61∗∗ 6.42 10.66∗∗ 11.72∗∗ 3.13
(5.16) (3.42) (2.65) (6.56) (5.24) (4.94) (4.41)
Elec-1 6.57 12.88∗∗∗ 9.24∗ 11.80∗∗ 15.94∗∗∗ 17.13∗∗∗ 13.40∗∗
(4.32) (4.33) (4.74) (5.66) (4.39) (4.09) (6.48)
Elec 7.22 13.20∗∗∗ 9.95∗∗∗ 5.09 8.65∗∗ 9.89∗∗∗ 6.56
(4.76) (2.71) (3.08) (3.47) (3.36) (3.15) (4.61)
Elec+1 2.02 3.35 1.88 1.28 3.31 4.10 -1.31
(3.36) (3.52) (2.76) (5.63) (4.89) (4.73) (4.44)
Elec+2 -3.66 -2.27 -5.46 -5.10 -3.00 -1.87 -1.81
(5.37) (4.20) (3.83) (7.70) (6.14) (6.11) (4.95)
Elec+3 -6.36 -4.83 -4.99 -1.02 1.14 1.59 -5.92
(4.98) (3.70) (3.32) (5.42) (4.53) (4.39) (5.88)
N 188880 188880 188880 92880 92880 92880 41820
R2 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.82
County·quarter Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year·quarter Y Y Y Y
Pair·year·quarter Y Y Y
Controls·trends Y Y Y
Controls·year·quarter Y Y
CD·year·quarter Y
Columns (1)-(3) based on 1751 counties, 49 states; columns (4)-(7) on 500 counties, 430 county-pairs, 71
border segments, 43 states. Dependent variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors
multiplied by 100 thousand for a per 100 thousand capita interpretation. “CD” refers to census division.
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the state level (columns 1-3) or two ways at the state and border
segment level (columns 4-7). ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Table 1.3: Heterogeneity tests. See also Figures 1.6 and 1.7 for the marginal effects.
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Table 1.4: Fixed effects results for state and local government employment, disaggregated by
employment subsectors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State government Local government
Pub. ad. Edu. JOS Pub. ad. Edu. JOS
Elec-3 4.05∗ 0.88 3.67∗∗ -2.11 0.44 -0.61
(2.11) (6.75) (1.79) (2.76) (4.17) (1.00)
Elec-2 7.60∗∗∗ 2.77 5.34∗∗∗ -0.73 3.42 -0.70
(2.13) (5.90) (1.95) (2.94) (5.13) (0.96)
Elec-1 7.49∗∗∗ 5.28 5.59∗∗∗ 0.90 1.57 0.33
(2.10) (6.68) (1.90) (2.59) (4.88) (0.84)
Elec 7.64∗∗∗ 7.61 4.05∗∗∗ 0.91 6.97 0.12
(1.78) (4.90) (1.51) (2.50) (4.66) (0.91)
Elec+1 5.04∗∗∗ 2.92 1.49 -0.96 4.28 -1.27∗
(1.69) (6.24) (1.51) (1.16) (3.28) (0.66)
Elec+2 1.20 -1.33 0.70 -2.84∗ 3.28 -1.74∗∗
(2.10) (5.73) (1.43) (1.54) (3.57) (0.82)
Elec+3 -2.97 0.15 -0.22 -2.22 0.82 -1.04
(2.30) (6.02) (1.67) (1.49) (3.25) (1.22)
N 77784 14952 20004 142768 92248 39876
R2 0.98 0.94 0.97 0.87 0.93 0.92
County·quarter Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year·quarter Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls·trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Counties 721 139 186 1324 856 370
States 46 34 39 47 41 31
Dependent variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors multiplied
by 100 thousand for a per 100 thousand capita interpretation. “JOS” refers to justice,
public order and safety. All specifications include county-quarter, year-quarter fixed
effects and controls interacted with time trends (column 2, Table 1.1). Standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered at the state-by-half of sample level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p< .01.
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Table 1.5: Fixed effects results disaggregated by other employment subsectors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed. Priv. Manu. Const. Retail Prof./bus.
Elec-3 1.73 31.49 18.26 9.31∗ 3.03 -4.15
(1.77) (21.46) (14.55) (4.90) (4.41) (5.35)
Elec-2 0.78 43.27∗∗ 22.76∗ 8.09∗ 6.26 -5.26
(2.39) (21.43) (11.69) (4.48) (4.20) (4.52)
Elec-1 0.40 36.72∗ 16.57∗ 4.80 5.90 -6.86
(1.93) (20.43) (9.86) (5.26) (3.98) (4.15)
Elec -0.08 15.38 9.35 2.58 3.87 -7.23
(1.52) (24.38) (10.59) (5.61) (4.12) (5.19)
Elec+1 -1.32 13.78 -0.06 9.35 0.05 -2.39
(1.95) (19.00) (16.00) (6.71) (2.73) (5.04)
Elec+2 -0.48 13.26 -2.39 8.52 4.00 -1.31
(1.76) (23.32) (22.36) (5.67) (2.56) (4.67)
Elec+3 -0.58 5.69 -7.59 7.56 3.54 -1.35
(1.26) (24.20) (20.57) (5.75) (3.01) (4.60)
N 186828 188880 160912 145904 185964 161668
R2 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.80 0.93 0.93
Counties 1732 1751 1492 1353 1724 1499
States 49 49 48 48 49 49
Dependent variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors multi-
plied by 100 thousand for a per 100 thousand capita interpretation. All specifications
include county-quarter, year-quarter fixed effects and controls interacted with time
trends (column 2, Table 1.1). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the state level.
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Table 1.6: County-pair effects results disaggregated by other employment subsectors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed. Priv. Manu. Const. Retail Prof./bus.
Elec-3 0.65 -45.46∗ -40.03∗∗∗ 7.74 7.62 -16.29∗∗
(2.12) (26.11) (9.79) (7.37) (5.84) (8.02)
Elec-2 0.64 -11.08 -40.25∗∗∗ 9.00 9.41 -8.72
(2.17) (28.40) (13.74) (8.86) (6.01) (6.83)
Elec-1 1.95 -11.76 -36.63∗∗∗ 3.91 7.13 -14.32∗∗
(1.54) (29.37) (13.38) (9.36) (6.32) (6.21)
Elec 0.03 -43.41∗ -39.76∗∗∗ -1.00 -1.99 -17.24∗∗
(1.62) (22.97) (10.91) (4.67) (6.20) (6.47)
Elec+1 -2.29 23.14 -15.95 7.93 3.47 -2.01
(2.40) (29.02) (14.33) (9.18) (7.31) (10.46)
Elec+2 -0.69 50.74∗ -9.35 5.84 9.94 2.23
(2.25) (29.20) (15.39) (10.44) (7.05) (12.23)
Elec+3 0.45 40.05∗ -2.26 5.49 11.87 -5.92
(1.85) (21.37) (12.19) (9.80) (7.55) (12.39)
N 90720 92880 68688 53568 90072 70632
R2 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.97
Counties 489 500 387 321 487 408
County-pairs 420 430 318 248 417 327
Border segments 70 71 67 60 71 66
States 43 43 42 42 43 43
Dependent variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors multiplied by
100 thousand for a per 100 thousand capita interpretation. All specifications include county-
quarter, pair-year-quarter fixed effects and controls interacted with time trends (column 5, Table
1.1). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the state level. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗
p< .01.
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Figure 1.3: Trends in state government, local government and private sector employment.
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Figure 1.4: Main sample for the fixed effects specifications.
Figure 1.5: Main sample for the county-pair specifications.
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1.7 Appendix B
1.7.1 Further heterogeneity results
Another potential source of heterogeneity is whether there is turnover in the party
of the governor (columns 1-2 of Table 1.10). For state government, employment cycles do
not depend on turnover; for local government, they are absent when the incumbent loses.
The mechanisms may be similar to the case of close and term-limited elections – when the
incumbent is less popular, support from local citizens and officials is likely to be less. State
government, on the other hand, is more directly influenced by the incumbent. These results
also suggest that the findings are not simply driven by cases where a new governor of the
opposition party takes power with a mandate to implement fiscally conservative policies or
to undo the policies of the previous administration.
One might expect the effect of a gubernatorial election to be different in a presiden-
tial election year compared to other years, since the bulk of media attention is generally
focused on the presidential race. However, it is not obvious what effect this should have. On
one hand, coattail effects may reduce the incentive to manipulate for individual governors;
on the other, governors likely still want to influence the presidential vote since low turnout
there will imply low turnout for the gubernatorial election. The results in columns (3)-(4)
of Table 1.10) show that for state government employment it does not matter. For local
government employment, the pattern appears more driven by non-presidential election
years, although the differences are not significant.
States with a higher than median unemployment rate may experience larger cycles.
When the unemployment rate is high, electoral cycles in government employment may
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be different: e.g., there is a larger pool of workers to hire from; employment may be
a more salient political issue, making separation more risky. In columns (5) and (6) of
Table 1.10, the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms are all positive, suggesting
that, indeed, the increase in employment leading up to elections appears more pronounced
when the unemployment rate is high. However, for the most part the differences are not
statistically significant. The exception is the post-electoral period for local government
employment, where 2 to 3 quarters after an election, high unemployment states have
significantly higher local government employment. That is, the post-election drop-off in
employment is substantially less abrupt, consistent with the reasoning above.
I also investigate how the employment cycles observed depend on other county
characteristics. To do so, I usually take a cross sectional variable such as income per capita
and divide the sample into high and low income counties, based on the median within each
state. Using the within state distribution of income, rather than the overall distribution,
helps guards against alternative explanations of the following kind: cycles are larger in high
income counties, but coastal states tend to have more high income counties, and cycles are
larger in coastal states for other reasons.
First, in columns (7)-(8) of Table 1.10, I test whether the effects are driven more
by counties of a particular long-term partisan leaning. In line with the partisan theories
mentioned above, it may be that left-wing constituents are more swayed by manipulation
than right-wing constituents. My measure of partisanship is the long-term (1984-2016)
average vote share for the Republican party in presidential elections. The results suggest
that local long-term partisanship largely does not matter – more or less Republican leaning
parts of a state appear to experience similar effects.
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The remainder of Table 1.10 and Table 1.11 investigate a range of additional socio-
economic and demographic variables: urbanicity, population density, income, educational
attainment, age structure, racial fractionalization, fraction of employment in goods produc-
ing compared to services, whether the state has above median state or local government
employment.39 Income and age structure do not appear to influence the magnitude of the
electoral cycles, but cycles do tend to be more pronounced in more urban, more densely
populated, and more educated counties. There are some quantitative differences in the
magnitude of the cycles for counties with different racial compositions, different mixes
of goods and services industries, and states with different levels of state and local gov-
ernment employment. Qualitatively however, in most cases the cycles are still generally
present. Thus, gubernatorial elections appear to induce employment effects that are fairly
generalized geographically.
1.7.2 Alternative specifications
One potential concern with my main specifications is serial correlation in the
dependent variable over time. One reason I do not use lagged dependent variables on the
right-hand side in my main specifications is because it may soak up manipulation that
occurred prior to the time of the lag. If governors adjust the timing of certain policies or
actions in anticipation of an election long in advance, then this manipulation could affect
the current employment rate through the lagged employment rate rather than through the
election dummies. The second reason for not including lagged dependent variables is that
39Income and goods producing fraction are at baseline 1990, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
urban dummy is from the National Council for Health Statistics and the remaining variables are from the
2000 census. Racial fractionalization is calculated as a Herfindahl index of ethnic shares.
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doing so in the presence of fixed effects gives rise to biased estimates (Nickell, 1981).
However, as noted by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Labonne (2016), the Nickell
bias disappears at the rate 1/T . Since my panel is quite long, with 108 quarters, these
asymptotics should come into play. In Tables 1.12 and 1.13 (columns 1 and 8) I consider
specifications that include lags – the results are largely consistent with the main findings.
In columns (2) and (9) of Tables 1.12-1.13, I consider specifications with the log
one-quarter growth rate as the dependent variable. In this case, a bump in employment
prior to elections is likely to manifest itself as a positive growth rate before the election
and a negative growth rate afterwards. The results confirm this. At some point prior to the
elections we see positive coefficients. Only for local government employment in the county-
pair approach is statistical significance not attained, although the sum of the coefficients
in the pre-electoral period is statistically significant (e.g., the sum Elec-3 through Elec is
statistically significant at the 10% level and the sum of Elec-3 through Elec-1 at the 1%
level). In the quarters following elections, there are negative and significant coefficients,
except in the case of local government employment in the fixed effects specifications, in
which case, again, the sum of coefficients is significant (the sum of Elec through Elec+3
at the 10% level and Elec+1 through Elec+3 at the 5% level). Columns (3) and (10) of
Tables 1.12-1.13 use the log of the level of employment as dependent variable, rather than
employment per capita, in which case the coefficient estimates are interpreted as percentage
increases in employment. Results are consistent with the main findings.
In the specifications considered prior to this point, I avoided including contempora-
neous values of the control variables out of endogeneity concerns. Columns (4) and (11) of
Tables 1.12-1.13 show that inferences do not change when the contemporaneous values are
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used instead of baseline values interacted with linear and quadratic time trends.
I have assumed implicitly that states experiencing an election are comparable to
any states that are not experiencing an election, regardless of how long ago these control
states held their most recent election. Most specifications include dummy variables for
which of the possible electoral cycles (presidential years, midterm years, off-years) a state
has, interacted with linear and quadratic time trends, to control for different long term
trajectories across these groups of states. However, given the periodic nature of electoral
cycles, the comparison may still be invalid. I therefore run specifications that drop counties
in states that have elections in off years (i.e., odd numbered years), thus only comparing
counties in states that have gubernatorial elections two years apart. These results are shown
in columns (5) and (12) of Tables 1.12-1.13. Even excluding these counties, the signature
pattern of increased pre-electoral employment persists. Only in the county-pair specification
for local government employment is the pattern somewhat attenuated, only significant at
the 10% level.
Another issue is that, in the county-pair analysis, I allowed a county to appear in the
regression as many times as it can be paired with a contiguous county in the neighboring
state. This means that counties with more pairs may implicitly receive greater weight in the
regressions. Weighting each county by the inverse of the number of pairs does not affect
the results (columns 6 and 13 of Table 1.13).
Columns (7) and (14) of Table 1.12-1.13 show that the results are not sensitive to the
fact that I have aggregated to the quarterly level – keeping the underlying data in monthly
form, inferences are largely unchanged. Similarly, columns (1)-(3) and (8)-(10) of Table
1.14 show the results when I aggregate to the state-quarter, county-year, and state-year
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levels. The findings are consistent with the main results. Columns (4)-(7) and (11)-(14)
show the results when clustering the standard errors at different levels – at the county level
or two ways at the state and year level. Inferences are similar to before.
1.7.3 Election window
Because elections are periodic, widening the election window means election
windows of different states will increasingly overlap. The idenfitication strategy is based
on comparison of states with and without elections. However, at some point the control
states will also hold elections themselves. Also, the longer the window, the less identifying
variation to identify each coefficient estimate – less states are eligible as controls, reducing
the possible cross-state comparisons. This is especially problematic for the county-pair
approach where states need to be adjacent. In my data, most states have elections two
years apart. Thus, with my preferred window there is no overlap for the majority of
observations.40 In some cases, there is overlap – some states have elections in odd numbered
years. However, the results are robust to dropping these states (columns 5 and 12 of Tables
1.12 and 1.13). That is, restricting to states that have elections two years apart, and thus no
overlap.
Despite these concerns, the results of extending the window by one and two
leads/lags are reported in Table 1.15 for the fixed effects approach. For state govern-
ment employment, none of the additional leads or lags are statistically significant. For local
government, only Elec+4 attains statistical significance. The coefficient estimate is negative
and small compared to the pre-electoral effect. This could be the result of post-election cuts
40One state’s Elec+3 is two quarters before the other state’s Elec-3. By widening the window, however,
the first state’s Elec+4 would be the same as the second state’s Elec-4, and election windows begin to overlap.
53
in local government employment, possibly delayed due to electoral concerns.
1.7.4 Poll workers
An alternative explanation of the findings is that we may simply observe increases
in government employment due to the hiring of poll workers to supervise polling stations
on election day, rather than any kind of political manipulation. There are several reasons
this is unlikely to be the case.
First, as previously noted, services performed by election workers are excluded
from unemployment insurance coverage if the worker makes less than $1,000 per year.41
Given prevailing compensation rates, the vast majority of workers should fall below this
threshold.42 Moreover, most of these poll workers are hired by local governments, in
particular county governments, rather than state governments.43 In the paper, cycles show
up for both local and state government. Thus, even if the local government effects are due
to election workers, this is much less likely for state government employment. There is
also some higher level election administration, usually carried out by permanent county
officials, e.g., the county clerk, as only one component of their duties. In some states,
there is a county board of elections or election commission, consisting of members elected
or appointed to a fixed, continuous, term. These positions would be classified as local
government employment. Similarly at the state level, usually election administrators are
permanent employees. Even if such permanent officials work more around elections, this
41Title 26, United States Code §3309(b)(3)(F) (2010), which regulates under the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA) coverage of state Unemployment Insurance laws.
42E.g., in San Diego County in the 2016 general election, workers could make between $75 and $175,
depending on the position, for work on election day (see sdvote.com/pollworkers/, accessed 3/6/17).
43National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx (accessed 3/6/17).
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would show up in their compensation rather than in the number of employees. Additionally,
the QCEW data excludes elected officials, members of a legislative body and members of
the judiciary.
With state government election officials it is also likely that any effects driven by
election administrators would be concentrated geographically in the state capital (local
government employees on the ground would report up to the state officials). As an additional
robustness check, I run a regression in which the counties containing the state capitals (and
hence the majority of the state level administrative offices) are excluded. The results are in
columns 6 and 13 of Table 1.12 and show that the effect is not driven by state capitals.
It is also important to note that the identification strategy makes it very unlikely
that the effects are due to election workers. Despite staggered gubernatorial election
cycles, all federal and state level offices up for election generally appear on a single ballot.
Thus, gubernatorial elections that coincide with federal elections (which occurs in any
even numbered year) are unlikely to entail significantly more election workers over and
above those already manning federal elections. That is, both treatment and control states
experience federal elections, and thus already have to hire poll workers, but treatment states
additionally have gubernatorial elections listed on the ballot. The exception would be states
that have elections in off-years, but the results are robust to excluding these states (see
columns 5 and 12 of Tables 1.12-1.13).
In Section 1.3.3 I found evidence that at least some of the effects are coming from
employment in justice, public order and safety, which would not include election workers.
Finally, election workers are typically only compensated for work on election day and, in
many cases, a training session usually held a few weeks before the election. However, the
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observed effects are often consistent with increased employment over a longer period of
time.
1.7.5 Senate elections
One of the principal threats to identification is simultaneous elections. Federal
elections that occur at the same time throughout the nation should be controlled for by
the year-quarter fixed effects. There are other elections, however, that take place in some
locations but not others and are not controlled for by the various fixed effects. Examples
include Senate elections, mayoral elections, city council elections, and other statewide
elected offices besides governor. It is impossible to include all these elections in my models,
though the fact that both state and local government employment exhibit cycles helps to
alleviate concerns that the results are driven solely by local elections. Additionally, I am
able to investigate perhaps the most important of these potentially confounding elections:
elections to the US Senate.
The system works as follows. Each state is assigned two senators, with each senator
belonging to one of three possible classes. Every even numbered year, one of the classes
of senators is up for re-election to a six year term. Thus, each state experiences a Senate
election every two out of three even numbered years, and there are sharp differences in
Senate election cycles across states and at state borders, shown in Figure 1.8. There were
467 Senate elections during my period of study.
Senate election variables are included in the model, defined analogously as in the
case of gubernatorial elections.44 The results are displayed in Table 1.16. The coefficient
44Special elections in the Senate are common, unlike for gubernatorial elections. Special elections are
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estimates for the gubernatorial election variables are largely very similar to those obtained
previously. Senate elections do not appear to matter in three of the four cases. The exception
is the fixed effects approach for local government employment, where the coefficient
estimates for the Senate are large, negative and significant before elections. It is not clear
why, but it is not consistent with manipulation. This anomaly aside, it is not surprising that
Senate elections do not appear to induce manipulation consistent effects since a senator’s
work is federal in nature and does not entail direct authority over state policy levers.
1.7.6 Placebo and jackknife tests
I implement two placebo tests. In the first,“Test 1,” I randomize whether each
state-year is a gubernatorial election year, with the restriction that no elections are held in
consecutive years, so that the probability of a given state-year is assigned an election is
approximately 0.25. Using these fake election dates, I then run the preferred specification.
Since fake elections are randomly assigned, they should affect employment. Similarly, in
“Test 2,” I randomly assigns each state one of the four possible four-year election cycles.
Table 1.9 shows the results of 1000 iterations. The first row shows how often the
maximum t-statistic corresponding to any of the seven election quarters using the placebo
election dates exceeds in absolute value the maximum t-statistic using the real election dates.
The second row shows the frequency with which the maximum placebo t-statistic exceeds
in absolute value the second largest t-statistic using the real election dates. These numbers
are informative about how unlikely it would be to observe findings more extreme than my
often closely related to economic conditions – e.g., senators retire when they do not expect to win re-election
– creating a more serious endogeneity problem. I therefore include the lagged dependent variable to control
for prevailing economic conditions, as when I had endogenous interactions in Section 1.3.3.
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main results if elections had no effect on employment. These are also very conservative
tests, since I only require one large t-statistic to be observed, whereas in the main results
there are usually multiple large t-statistics. Additionally, no restriction is imposed on which
election variable should be significant or the sign. That is, placebo effects need not be
consistent with manipulation to count as “more extreme.” The results suggest that similar
results under the null that elections do not affect employment are very unlikely, especially
for the first test (for the second, there remains a decent probability that the correct election
cycle is assigned).
Another possibility is that the estimates are driven by a handful of extreme state
level shocks that coincidentally occurred around elections. Following Foremny and Riedel
(2014), I perform a jackknife analysis to test the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of
a handful of states at a time. I sequentially exclude each of the nine census divisions. Tables
1.17 and 1.18 show the results.45 In each case, the usual pattern appears, and remains
pronounced in most cases. Similarly, I divide my sample period into six consecutive periods
of 18 quarters in length and sequentially exclude each one. The results are displayed in
Table 1.19 and are largely unchanged. The estimated coefficient for the election quarter is
highly statistically significant in all subsamples, with some variation in the timing of when
the effects kick in or drop off.
45For the fixed effects sample only – the county-pair sample is already relatively small without losing
additional observations, which is exacerbated by, on top of the omitted counties, the loss of counties that
border on the omitted census division, since we need both counties in a pair for the pair-year-quarter effects
to be identified. In any case, running the jackknife analyses using the county-pair sample generally shows the
usual pattern of positive coefficient estimates leading up to elections, though sometimes they do not attain
statistical significance (results not reported).
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1.7.7 Alternative samples
Even though my main sample excludes counties whose maximum (minimum)
change in quarter-to-quarter employment per capita is in the top or bottom 1%, some very
large quarter-to-quarter changes remain. In multiple instances, the number of employees per
capita more than doubled or halved from one quarter to the next. Though in some cases this
could be due to administrative changes in industry classifications, I am hesitant to exclude
these counties from the main sample as often these are real changes and not necessarily
even extreme – imagine, say, the closure of a large state prison that accounts for most of
a county’s state government employment. In any case, to ensure the results are robust to
such outliers, I exclude counties for which employment per capita in either state or local
government more than doubled or halved. This leaves 1223 counties for the fixed effects
sample and 450 counties (381 pairs) for the county-pair sample. The results are shown in
columns (1)-(4) of Table 1.20. The usual pattern persists and, in fact, becomes even more
pronounced for state government employment. These results suggest that outliers are not
driving the results – if anything, they tend to add noise and work against finding effects.
I previously restricted to counties that do not have suppressed data for both state
and local government employment. There are less state government employees than local
in general, and the majority of the loss comes from counties with suppressed state data.
Thus, I restrict attention to local government employment only and relax the requirement
that state data not be suppressed. Doing so allows me to increase the number of counties
from 1751 to 2085 in the fixed effects sample, and from 500 to 637 (430 to 575 pairs)
in the county-pair sample. The expanded samples are shown in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. In
particular, I recover a substantial number of the counties in Illinois and Michigan, which
59
were largely missing from the main sample. Columns (5)-(6) of Table 1.20 show the results.
The coefficient estimates follow the usual pattern observed, are similar in magnitude, and
highly statistically significant.
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Figure 1.6: Coefficient estimates for heterogeneity by political/institutional factors. Each pair
of figures corresponds to one regression: the two figures graph the marginal effects for the two
types of counties. Corresponds to Table 1.3. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.7: Coefficient estimates for further heterogeneity tests by political/institutional factors.
Each pair of figures corresponds to one regression: the two figures graph the marginal effects
for the two types of counties. Corresponds to Table 1.3. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence
intervals.
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Table 1.7: Summary statistics for the sample of all counties used in the fixed effects regressions.
Mean s.d. Min Median Max
Employment
State government 1774 5689 8 299 115526
Local government 5135 15135 153 1649 475959
Private sector 42861 138724 172 9355 3807722
Employment per capita
State government 0.013 0.017 0.000 0.008 0.301
Local government 0.050 0.016 0.005 0.046 0.351
Private sector 0.280 0.107 0.040 0.270 1.213
Political variables
Elec window (7 qtrs) 0.453 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
Senate elec window (7 qtrs) 0.610 0.488 0.000 1.000 1.000
Presidential cycle dummy 0.200 0.400 0.000 0.000 1.000
Off-years cycle dummy 0.135 0.342 0.000 0.000 1.000
Close 0.087 0.282 0.000 0.000 1.000
Incumbent term limited 0.117 0.321 0.000 0.000 1.000
Turnover 0.155 0.362 0.000 0.000 1.000
Strict balanced budget 0.380 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000
Presidential elec. window 0.481 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Dem. incumbent 0.212 0.409 0.000 0.000 1.000
Governor and legislature aligned 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 1.000
Aligned -0.001 0.465 -1.000 0.000 1.000
Pop. 119634 356095 2204 35461 10294383
Income per cap. 33769 8388 8034 32375 132004
Goods fraction 0.310 0.130 0.022 0.295 0.793
Cross sectional variables
Urban 0.297 0.457 0.000 0.000 1.000
Avg. Rep. vote share 0.572 0.107 0.174 0.578 0.891
Baseline pop. (1990) 102962 309553 2905 31565 8878157
Baseline income per cap. (1990) 27979 5909 10214 27403 62939
Baseline goods fraction (1990) 0.360 0.140 0.047 0.346 0.788
Baseline local govt. (1990) 0.046 0.012 0.006 0.044 0.112
Baseline state govt. (1990) 0.013 0.017 0.000 0.007 0.286
Pop. density (2000) 270 1457 1 56 34915
Share with bachelor’s or up (2000) 0.164 0.072 0.049 0.145 0.602
Racial fractionalization (2000) 0.218 0.170 0.009 0.166 0.723
Share aged 65 up (2000) 0.143 0.035 0.039 0.141 0.315
Based on main sample of 1751 counties in 49 states, 188880 observations.
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Table 1.8: Summary statistics for the sample of all counties used in the county-pair regressions.
Mean s.d. Min Median Max
Employment
State government 1391 3499 9 358 67032
Local government 4592 8137 160 1860 82439
Private sector 39307 82160 244 10301 806851
Employment per capita
State government 0.012 0.013 0.000 0.008 0.285
Local government 0.048 0.017 0.005 0.045 0.348
Private sector 0.284 0.106 0.052 0.274 1.213
Political and other variables
Elec window (7 qtrs) 0.457 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
Senate elec window (7 qtrs) 0.610 0.488 0.000 1.000 1.000
Presidential cycle dummy 0.202 0.402 0.000 0.000 1.000
Off-years cycle dummy 0.143 0.350 0.000 0.000 1.000
Close 0.091 0.287 0.000 0.000 1.000
Incumbent term limited 0.127 0.332 0.000 0.000 1.000
Turnover 0.163 0.369 0.000 0.000 1.000
Strict balanced budget 0.403 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000
Presidential elec. window 0.481 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Dem. incumbent 0.231 0.422 0.000 0.000 1.000
Governor and legislature aligned 0.223 0.416 0.000 0.000 1.000
Aligned 0.003 0.473 -1.000 0.000 1.000
Pop. 108881 196193 2204 40186 1604836
Income per cap. 33808 8718 8143 32132 132004
Goods fraction 0.313 0.131 0.035 0.297 0.793
Cross sectional variables
Urban 0.286 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000
Avg. Rep. vote share 0.570 0.107 0.174 0.574 0.882
Baseline pop. (1990) 91403 181245 2905 33863 1584293
Baseline income per cap. (1990) 28008 6212 16117 27138 62620
Baseline goods fraction (1990) 0.370 0.144 0.047 0.357 0.719
Baseline local govt. (1990) 0.045 0.012 0.006 0.042 0.096
Baseline state govt. (1990) 0.012 0.015 0.001 0.007 0.182
Pop. density (2000) 294 1618 1 56 31707
Share with bachelor’s or up (2000) 0.164 0.075 0.055 0.145 0.543
Racial fractionalization (2000) 0.215 0.166 0.012 0.154 0.715
Share aged 65 up (2000) 0.143 0.032 0.049 0.142 0.259
Based on sample of 500 counties, forming 430 county-pairs, along 71 border segments, in 43
states, 92880 observations.
65
Figure 1.8: Distribution of US Senate election classes.
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Figure 1.9: Alternative sample for the fixed effects specifications, based on all counties for
which local government employment is available.
Figure 1.10: Alternative sample for the county-pairs specifications, based on all counties for
which local government employment is available.
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Table 1.9: Placebo tests.
# of times observed
State govt. Local govt.
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
Regression outcome FE BP FE BP FE BP FE BP
Placebo t-stat exceeds largest
actual t-stat
0 19 6 190 0 2 10 170
Placebo t-stat exceeds second
largest actual t-stat
40 120 62 246 20 96 62 216
Based on 1000 iterations, using preferred specifications. Test 1 assigns each state-
year a gubernatorial election such that no elections are in consecutive years and the
probability of an election is approximately 0.25. Test 2 assigns each state a four year
electoral cycle with probability 0.25 each. “Placebo t-stat exceeds actual (second)
largest t-stat ” means that the largest t-statistic (in absolute value) from the placebo
regression exceeded the (second) largest t-stat in the true regression. For the fixed
effects approach, the relevant t-stats are 3.34 and 2.34 for state government, 4.87 and
2.97 for local government; for the county-pair approach they 2.14 and 1.99 for state,
3.63 and 2.57 for local.
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Table 1.10: Further heterogeneity tests.
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Table 1.11: Further heterogeneity tests.
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Table 1.12: Alternative specifications for the fixed effects approach.
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Table 1.13: Alternative specifications for the county-pair approach.
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Table 1.14: Alternative levels of aggregation and clustering.
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Table 1.15: Alternative specifications with a longer window.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State govt. Local govt.
Elec-5 4.46 3.16
(3.82) (7.35)
Elec-4 3.48 3.50 -0.20 -0.18
(3.67) (3.68) (4.55) (4.58)
Elec-3 1.10 1.10 -0.32 7.83∗ 7.82∗ 5.32
(2.98) (2.98) (3.43) (4.06) (4.06) (3.78)
Elec-2 6.23∗ 6.23∗ 6.23∗ 8.19∗∗ 8.19∗∗ 8.19∗∗
(3.37) (3.37) (3.37) (3.42) (3.42) (3.42)
Elec-1 6.80∗ 6.80∗ 8.47∗∗ 12.88∗∗∗ 12.87∗∗∗ 14.06∗∗
(3.38) (3.39) (4.15) (4.33) (4.33) (6.20)
Elec 7.32∗∗∗ 7.86∗∗ 7.87∗∗ 13.20∗∗∗ 11.66∗∗∗ 11.67∗∗∗
(2.19) (3.19) (3.19) (2.71) (3.29) (3.30)
Elec+1 4.85∗∗ 4.84∗∗ 3.93 3.35 3.34 1.73
(2.07) (2.08) (2.69) (3.52) (3.53) (4.47)
Elec+2 1.64 1.64 1.64 -2.27 -2.28 -2.28
(3.26) (3.26) (3.26) (4.20) (4.21) (4.21)
Elec+3 -1.14 -1.15 1.54 -4.83 -4.85 -2.94
(3.55) (3.55) (5.03) (3.70) (3.71) (3.65)
Elec+4 -1.13 -1.12 -6.21∗∗ -6.20∗∗
(3.76) (3.76) (2.59) (2.59)
Elec+5 -2.30 -4.05
(2.73) (4.54)
N 188880 188880 188880 188880 188880 188880
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.88 0.88
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Preferred specification Y Y
Dependent variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100 thousand
for a per 100 thousand capita interpretation. Columns 1 and 3 use preferred specifications (columns 2
and 5 of Table 1.1 in the text). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the state level. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗
p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Table 1.16: Fixed effects and county-pair results for Senate elections.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State govt. Local govt.
Elec-3 5.35 2.40 8.49∗∗ 10.40
(3.95) (5.00) (3.93) (6.67)
Elec-2 8.58∗∗ 7.98∗∗ 8.25∗ 19.19∗∗
(3.62) (3.73) (4.75) (7.86)
Elec-1 6.83∗ 3.45 6.78 11.34∗∗
(3.43) (3.38) (4.56) (4.93)
Elec 8.38∗∗∗ 3.00 9.99∗∗ 7.26
(2.07) (3.70) (4.68) (4.44)
Elec+1 6.09∗∗ -3.05 1.69 3.27
(2.30) (3.48) (4.53) (5.51)
Elec+2 -2.57 -6.50∗ -9.04 -14.64∗
(3.38) (3.65) (6.33) (7.71)
Elec+3 -6.50∗ -7.87∗ -15.24∗∗ -16.04∗∗
(3.68) (4.07) (6.55) (6.88)
SenElec-3 -2.10 -3.83 -14.81∗∗ 10.13
(2.65) (5.53) (5.78) (9.96)
SenElec-2 -1.16 -8.59 -21.63∗∗∗ -3.40
(2.68) (6.39) (5.22) (10.66)
SenElec-1 -2.85 -5.81 -11.18∗ 3.20
(2.67) (6.25) (5.58) (10.85)
SenElec -3.28 -3.48 -6.09 12.84
(2.67) (4.80) (5.87) (8.94)
SenElec+1 -0.63 1.88 -6.77 -23.47
(3.21) (4.72) (6.78) (14.89)
SenElec+2 -0.14 -1.24 -0.73 -8.98
(3.44) (4.58) (5.95) (12.36)
SenElec+3 0.56 -2.51 7.04 -9.46
(3.16) (7.21) (6.10) (10.81)
N 181876 89440 181876 89440
R2 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
Fixed effects Y Y
County-pair Y Y
Columns (1)-(2) based on sample of 1751 counties in 49 states;
columns (3)-(4) based on sample of 500 counties, forming 430
county-pairs, along 71 border segments, in 43 states. Dependent
variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors
multiplied by 100 thousand for a per 100 thousand capita inter-
pretation. Preferred specifications (Table 1.1, columns 2 and 5).
Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the state level in the
fixed effects regressions and, in the county-pair regressions, addi-
tionally at the border segment level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p< .01.
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Table 1.20: Results for local government on larger sample that does not require state government
not be suppressed (columns 1-2), and robustness to outliers (columns 3-6).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State Local State Local Local
Elec-3 4.98∗ 7.50 5.86∗ 6.28 7.03∗ 7.04
(2.49) (4.52) (3.08) (6.41) (3.87) (5.50)
Elec-2 9.81∗∗∗ 7.94∗∗ 9.66∗∗∗ 10.03∗ 8.09∗∗ 11.95∗∗
(3.19) (3.77) (2.71) (5.91) (3.46) (4.87)
Elec-1 9.66∗∗∗ 14.02∗∗∗ 8.20∗∗∗ 14.61∗∗ 13.01∗∗∗ 15.78∗∗∗
(2.91) (4.97) (2.72) (5.44) (3.98) (3.58)
Elec 9.76∗∗∗ 11.31∗∗∗ 7.08∗∗ 7.25∗ 14.31∗∗∗ 10.15∗∗∗
(2.12) (2.89) (2.94) (4.07) (2.60) (3.34)
Elec+1 8.22∗∗∗ 2.42 4.80∗ 0.36 6.84∗ 10.29
(1.81) (3.54) (2.57) (4.49) (3.55) (7.31)
Elec+2 4.28 -2.83 3.40 -6.20 0.96 2.97
(2.72) (3.54) (2.61) (6.26) (4.12) (7.56)
Elec+3 0.94 -3.76 -1.05 0.18 -3.59 4.98
(2.82) (3.52) (2.58) (4.37) (3.31) (6.01)
N 131960 131960 82296 82296 224888 124200
R2 0.98 0.92 0.98 0.89 0.89 0.92
Fixed effects Y Y Y
County-pair Y Y Y
Dropped outliers Y Y Y Y
Larger sample Y Y
Counties 1223 1223 450 450 2085 637
County-pairs 381 381 575
Border segments 69 69 80
States 49 49 43 43 50 45
Dependent variable is employment per capita; coefficients and standard errors multiplied by
100 thousand for a per 100 thousand capita interpretation. Preferred specifications (Table 1.1,
columns 2 and 5). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the state level for the fixed effects
models and two way at the state and border segment level for the county-pair models. ∗ p< 0.10,
∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Chapter 2
The Democratic-Republican
presidential growth gap and the
partisan balance of the state
governments
90
Abstract: The US economy grew faster during Democratic presidencies, but this
Democratic-Republican presidential GDP growth gap cannot be fully attributed to policy
differences, nor did Democratic presidents happen to systematically benefit from more
favorable external shocks (Blinder and Watson 2016). The question of why thus remains
open. We postulate that, if this is a real effect, a Democratic performance advantage should
be present in a broader range of settings beyond just the presidency. We investigate the
partisan control of the state governments and show that national GDP growth was higher
when more states had Democratic governors and state legislatures. Our results suggest this
effect occurs on top of the presidential D-R growth gap, suggesting that the Democratic
growth advantage may be a more generalized phenomenon. One implication of our results is
that future research investigating the effects of government ideology on national economic
outcomes may benefit from considering partisan politics at lower jurisdictional levels as
well.
Keywords: Democratic-Republican GDP growth gap, federalism, partisan politics,
government ideology, Democrats, Republicans.
2.1 Introduction
Short-term GDP growth in the United States was higher under Democratic presidents
than under Republicans. Scholars arrived at this conclusion quite some time ago.1 The
difference in economic performance under Democratic and Republican presidents, the D-R
1Hibbs (1986, 1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Haynes and Stone (1990), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995),
Belke (1996), Alesina et al. (1997), Blomberg and Hess (2003), Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), Verstyuk
(2004), Krause (2005), Bartels (2008), Grier (2008), Rohlfs et al. (2015).
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presidential growth gap, has enjoyed a great deal of attention recently owing to the study
by Blinder and Watson (2016) – abbreviated as BW in the following. The authors show
that, over the period 1949-2012, the annualized quarterly GDP growth rate was on average
around 1.79 percentage points higher under Democratic compared to Republican presidents
(4.33 percent under Democratic presidents versus 2.54 under Republicans). The question is
why.
The partisan theories (Hibbs 1977, Chappell and Keech 1986, Alesina 1987) propose
that GDP growth is higher under Democratic presidents than under Republican presidents
because Democrats implement more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, e.g., in-
creasing government expenditure or decreasing interest rates.2 However, fiscal policies
under Democratic presidents hardly differed from those of Republican presidents, while
monetary policies differed only to some extent (Hibbs 1986 and 1987, Havrilesky 1987,
Alesina et al. 1997, Faust and Irons 1999, Caporale and Grier 2000 and 2005, Abrams
and Iossifov 2006, Chen and Wang 2013, BW, Pastor and Veronesi 2017).3 The results
of BW suggest that national fiscal and monetary policies do not help to explain the D-R
presidential growth gap.
BW use many other variables to explain the D-R presidential growth gap. In
part, Democrats just had good luck – benign oil shocks, superior total factor productivity
performance and a more favorable international environment explain about half of the
higher GDP growth under Democratic presidents. A substantial portion of the gap, however,
2For example, interest rates were expected to be higher and the dollar to be stronger under a George W.
Bush presidency than under John Kerry (Snowberg et al. 2007a, b).
3On ideology-induced policies in OECD countries see Schmidt (1996) and Potrafke (2017). Long-run
growth was higher under rightwing than leftwing governments in industrialized and developing countries
(Bjrnskov 2005).
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remains unexplained. BW (p. 1043) conclude: “these factors together explain up to 56
percent of the D-R growth gap in the full sample . . . The rest remains, for now, a mystery
of the still mostly unexplored continent. The word research taken literally, means search
again. We invite other researchers to do so.” We propose to investigate this puzzle from
a somewhat different angle. To the extent that there is a fundamental reason behind the
D-R presidential growth gap, we might expect to see a similar phenomenon in the case of
other measures of Democratic control, not just for the presidency. We therefore examine
the relationship between partisan politics at the state level, namely the share of the state
governorships and legislatures controlled by the Democratic Party (as well as unified state
governments), and national economic performance.
State politics is a particularly natural place to look next – the US state governments
have quite some leeway to implement discretionary economic policies which, in turn, are
likely to influence GDP growth both in the long-run and the short-run (business cycle).
We focus on short-run quarterly and annual GDP growth. For example, state governments
design tax rates and minimum wages and, to a large extent, decide on the composition of
the state budget, and expansionary policies implemented by individual state governments,
especially in highly populated and economically influential US states such as California,
Texas or New York, are likely to influence national quarterly and annual GDP growth.
Indeed, California is the worlds “7th largest economy”, and these states often set the trends
for the rest of the nation.4 Key components of US GDP may be highly dependent on
state policies. For example, energy has seen a recent boom in Texas and other currently
Republican leaning states such as North Dakota, due partly to developments in hydraulic
4https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-16/brown-s-california-overtakes-brazil-with-
companies-leading-world.
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fracturing, a procedure banned in Democratic leaning New York, Vermont and Maryland.
While governors and state legislatures have substantial influence on their own (Brudney
and Herbert 1987, Jens 2017, Cahan 2019), state government partisanship is likely to be
most important when the governorship and majorities in the State House and State Senate
are controlled by the same party, that is, under a unified state government. Empirically,
as well, it is advantageous to look at state governments because the share of Democratic
state governments exhibits much greater variation over time compared to a simple dummy
variable for the party of the president. Despite the apparent importance of the state
governments, however, previous studies did not examine the connection between partisan
control at the state level and the national level economic outcomes.
Our results suggest that more Democrats governed in state governments during times
of higher short-run national GDP growth – there is a strong positive correlation between
GDP growth and the fraction of US states controlled by Democratic governors or by
unified Democratic state governments. This correlation is present during both Democratic
and Republican presidencies. Given this finding, we might expect that the Democratic
control variables at the state level may be highly correlated with the Democratic president
dummy variable, so that we are simply picking up presidential growth gap with a slightly
different variable. However, this is not the case. Quite the opposite. The Democratic
state government variables are largely orthogonal to the Democratic president variable,
suggesting that we are observing an additional Democratic performance advantage on top
of the D-R presidential gap already known. If anything, the party of the president tends to
lose state governorships and legislatures over the course of the presidents tenure, and this
state-level effect may even work to dampen the D-R presidential growth gap. We predict
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using the VAR-based method of BW that GDP growth gap might have been even larger, by
as much as 0.42-0.60 percentage points, were it not for changes in the partisan control of
the state governments. This finding anything but explains the D-R presidential growth gap.
Rather, the Democratic performance advantage appears to extend to the partisan balance of
the state governments as well, on top of the D-R presidential growth gap, making the latter
phenomenon seem perhaps even more puzzling.
If more Democratic governorships or state legislatures are associated with higher
economic performance at the national level, we also expect that an individual state should
experience higher performance under a Democratic governor or legislature. Indeed, this
was the finding of previous studies (Chang et al. 2009). Here we also provide additional
evidence that states with Democratic state governments had higher annual income per
capita growth than states with Republican state governments, paying particular attention to
highly populated states such as California, Texas and New York because these large states
contribute disproportionately to the national GDP (for example, the top 10 states in terms
of population made up 54 percent of the national population in 2016).
In line with BW, we acknowledge that we do not estimate a causal effect of (state)
government partisanship on national GDP growth. Pastor and Veronesi (2017) suggest
that Democratic presidents did not cause higher GDP growth than Republican presidents.
In fact, risk-aversion, which is high during economic crises, is proposed as the source of
the Democratic advantage because Democrats are likely to provide more social insurance
than Republicans. Indeed, this argument should also apply at the state level, providing
a plausible interpretation of our findings. Kane (2017) argues that the D-R presidential
growth gap becomes smaller when a longer time lag between the inauguration of a new
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president and economic outcomes is used. We elaborate on the timing issue and discuss
different lag choices. In any case, while there is no econometric strategy to estimate causal
effects of government partisanship on macroeconomic variables at the national level, the
D-R presidential growth gap remains an important empirical regularity in need of further
investigation.
2.2 The political pendulum at the state level
Over time the political pendulum swings, and the popularity of the incumbent
president generally decreases. The president cannot be voted out of office until his term
expires, but ample opportunities arise in lower level elections to express dissatisfaction
(or apathy, by not turning out to vote). Figure 1 shows the share of state governorships
that are controlled by the Democratic Party, over the period 1949-2017. We weight the
share of Democratic governors by the population of the individual states because we will
relate these variables to national GDP growth in sections 3 and 4, and states with larger
populations contribute more to national GDP than less populated states.5 The pattern is
stark: at the beginning of Democratic presidential terms, the share of population weighted
Democratic governors was 56 percent on average. By contrast, in the last year of Democratic
presidential terms, the share of population weighted Democratic governors was 45 percent
on average. In the first year of a Republican term, it was 46 percent, rising to 57 percent
by the last year of the term. We also examine Democratic legislatures and unified state
5The weighted and unweighted measures are similar: the correlation coefficients between the weighted
and unweighted Democratic share of governors, legislatures, and unified state governments are all about 0.92.
The results are similar when we weight by state income (gross state product is not available over the full
sample period).
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governments (Figures 2 and 3). The share of Democratic legislatures (unified governments)
was around 54 percent (39 percent) in the first and 40 percent (28 percent) in the last year of
a Democratic presidential term. The share of Republican legislatures (unified governments)
was 32 percent (24 percent) in the first year of Republican terms, falling to 21 percent (13
percent) in the last year.
Thus, newly elected presidents enjoyed many copartisan governors and unified
state governments – but tended to lose them over time. In the case of governorships,
the share of Democratic governors was almost always decreasing during Democratic
presidencies, except for Clinton, during whose second term the Democratic Party picked up
state governorships (most notably California in 1998). While the trends under Eisenhower,
Nixon, and Ford are of large and steady losses of Republican governorships, the Republican
Party was successful in state elections under Reagan, G. H. W. and G. W. Bush – the trends
are quite flat and include periods of gains.
In the case of state legislature control, the share of legislatures controlled by the
presidents party does not follow such a regular pattern – both parties tended to lose state
legislatures over time, but there were frequent gains as well. The partisan balance was
quite stable during Reagans and G. H. W. Bushs terms, although Republicans held very few
states to begin with, so there was not much to lose. Nixon-Ford performed notably poorly,
the share of Republican state legislatures dropping from almost 50 percent at the beginning
to essentially zero at the end of Fords term, a lot of the loss coming in the 1974 midterm
elections, only three months after Nixons resignation. Clinton also oversaw substantial
loses during his first term, though the situation stabilized during his second term.
For unified state governments, Nixon and Ford again stand out as especially weak.
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Johnson also lost many unified governments late in his term in the 1966 midterm elections,
during the height of the unpopular Vietnam war and shortly following the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Obamas first term is characterized by a substantial increase
in Republican unified governments in the 2010 midterm elections, though the number of
Democratic unified governments remained fairly stable and even increased at times during
his presidency.
2.3 State government partisanship and national GDP
growth
In the first year of Democratic presidential terms, we observe both (a) large shares
of Democratic governors and unified Democratic state governments and (b) especially
pronounced quarterly GDP growth (see also BW) – on average quarterly real GDP growth
(annualized) was 4.47 during the first year of Democratic terms compared to 0.67 percent
during the first year of Republican terms (2.1). We therefore expect the share of Democratic
governors and unified Democratic state governments to be an excellent predictor of national
GDP growth. In this section establish the correlation between the partisan control of the
state governments and national GDP growth – in the next section we will investigate to
what extent it explains the D-R presidential growth gap or, in other words, to what extent it
is a separate phenomenon.
We estimate a linear regression model with Newey-West standard errors using
the quarterly growth in real national GDP (annualized) as the dependent variable and
a Democratic president dummy variable as the explanatory variable. In 2.2, column
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(1), we simply estimate the D-R presidential growth gap for the period 1949:II-2017:I.
The coefficient estimate of the Democratic president dummy variable is 1.50, indicating
that the D-R growth gap was 1.50 percentage points, moderately smaller than BWs D-R
growth gap of 1.79 for the period 1949:II-2013:I. We follow BW and assign the quarter
during which the new president is inaugurated and power changes hands (the first quarter,
January-March, of the post-election year) to the outgoing president. In column (2), we only
include the share of Democratic governors, without the presidential dummy. Following
the same convention as for presidents, a new governors influence is assumed to start in
their first full quarter (April-June of the post gubernatorial election year). In columns
(3) and (4) we include the share of Democratic and Republican controlled legislatures
and unified Democratic and Republican state governments as explanatory variables, again
without the presidential dummy. In columns (5) to (7) we include the Democratic president
variable together with either the share of Democratic governors, the share of Democratic
and Republican controlled legislatures, or the unified Democratic and Republican state
government variable. The coefficient estimate for the share of Democratic governors is
4.39 in column (2). Since the standard deviation of the Democratic share of governors
is 0.13, we conclude that a one standard deviation increase in the share of Democratic
governorships is associated with a 0.57 percentage point increase in the real national GDP
growth rate. The coefficient estimate for the share of Democratic state legislatures is 7.25,
so that a one standard deviation (about 0.16) increase (at the expense of split legislatures)
in the share of Democratic state legislatures is associated with a 1.16 percentage point
increase in the real national GDP growth rate. Similarly, the coefficient for Democratic
unified state governments, 5.91 (in column 4), suggests that a one standard deviation (about
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0.13) increase (at the expense of non-unified state governments) in the Democratic unified
state government share is associated with a 0.77 percentage point increase in the real GDP
growth rate. The variables measuring Republican state government control lack statistical
significance.6
An obvious objection is that the share of Democratic governors or unified gov-
ernments and the Democratic president dummy variable may be highly correlated and
essentially measure the same thing. However, the correlation coefficients are only -0.056
and 0.060, and the coefficient estimate for the Democratic president dummy variable re-
mains statistically significant and similar in magnitude in columns (5) to (7). This suggests
that the state government partisanship variables are highly correlated with GDP growth, but
are largely orthogonal to the Democratic president dummy variable. We investigate this
further in the next section. Including interaction terms, the positive correlation between the
share of Democratic governors or unified governments and national GDP growth is present
under both Democratic and Republican presidencies. Column (8) shows that the correlation
between the share of Democratic governors and national GDP growth is positive under both
Democratic and Republican presidents, though falls short of statistical significance at con-
ventional levels during Republican presidencies. In column (9), the coefficient estimate for
the share of Democratic unified state governments is also positive during both Democratic
and Republican presidencies and is statistically significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent
levels.
An important issue is the timing of when changes in partisan control is likely to
predict annual GDP growth. Following BW, we have so far assumed that a new president
6We do not include the share of Republican governors. As there were only a handful of independent
governors, it is almost exactly one minus the share of Democratic governors.
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or governor starts to take effect during their first full quarter. Kane (2017) maintains that
it takes longer than one quarter for a new government to affect GDP growth, because
it takes quite some time for new legislation and policies to be implemented. Consumer
behavior and firm investment decisions have, however, been shown to immediately respond
to electoral outcomes due to shifts in expectations (Snowberg 2007a and 2007b, Gerber
and Huber 2009, Julio and Yook 2012, Jens 2017, Falk and Shelton 2018). In 2.3, we use
different lags and leads of state government partisanship as explanatory variables. A lag (or
lead) of k means that we regress GDP growth in the current quarter on the government k
quarters from the current quarter – up to now we used the BW assumption of one lag. The
correlation between Democratic state government control and GDP growth is strong for
lags 0 to 3. For governors and legislatures, the correlation is less pronounced and no longer
statistically significant when we consider lags of more than three quarters, while for unified
governments it remains positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level up to
the 10th lag. The first and second leads of Democratic state government control (governors
and unified governments) are also positively and significantly correlated with GDP growth,
suggesting that high national GDP growth may have preceded Democratic victories in state
elections (Pastor and Veronesi 2017). We return to alternative lag assumptions in the next
section.
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2.4 Explaining the D-R growth gap (BW model)
2.4.1 Methods
We investigate whether state government control can “explain” the D-R presidential
growth gap in the framework of BW, which is informative to whether what we are observing
is a separate phenomenon that occurs on top of the D-R presidential growth gap, or whether
we may be just picking up the same effect. BW (p. 1028f.) consider many explanatory
variables potentially accounting for the observed D-R presidential growth gap. Intuitively,
the idea is that the D-R presidential growth gap may be attributed to these potentially
omitted variables rather than to the Democratic president dummy. The explanatory variables
include, for example, oil shocks from Hamilton (2003), defense spending shocks from
Ramey (2011), monetary policy shocks from Romer and Romer (2004) and Sims (2006).
We investigate similar models incorporating our variables capturing the partisan balance of
the state governments. A (z,x)-VAR model is estimated, where x consists of explanatory
variables and z includes the GDP growth rate, inflation (measured by the GDP deflator), the
three-month Treasury bill rate, and commodity prices. The lag length used is six quarters.
The residuals et from the VAR model are then used as regressors in a distributed lag model,
in which the growth rate of real GDP is regressed on et and six of its lags: that is, the model
is yt = γ(L)et +other factors. As BW (p. 1028) explain, the average realization of γ(L)et
during Democratic presidencies may be different than during Republican presidencies. First,
the shocks et are time varying, and their realization will differ over different time periods.
Second, the coefficients (lag weights) γ may be different during Democratic and Republican
presidencies, because different parties may respond to or be affected by the same shock
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differently. Following BW, we run specifications where the γ are constrained to be the same
for both parties (common lag weights), and specifications where they are not constrained
(party-specific lag weights). There are good reasons to believe that the lag weights should
be able to differ by party – a decrease in the share of Democratic state governments may
certainly elicit a different response from a Democratic presidential administration compared
to a Republican administration.
BW show (a) univariate results that are based on regressions only including one e
variable and (b) multivariate results that are based on regressions including more than one e
variable. We do the same including our state politics variables. Again, the purpose is to
show how much of the D-R presidential growth gap is “explained” by the e variables. That
is, based on the e shocks and the estimated lag weights γˆ, one estimates the predicted D-R
presidential growth gap due to the variable of interest: the predicted GDP growth rate under
Democratic presidents minus the predicted GDP growth rate under Republican presidents
(p. 1029f.). This is the explained portion of the D-R presidential growth gap. For a given
variable, if the explained portion of the D-R presidential growth gap is positive, it means
that the variable predicts higher GDP growth under Democratic compared to Republican
presidents, thus contributing to the D-R presidential growth gap and helping to explain it.
For example, the Hamilton oil price shock explains about 50 basis points of the full sample
179 basis point D-R presidential growth gap. If the explained portion is negative, it means
that the variable predicts higher GDP growth under Republican compared to Democratic
presidents, thus working to close the D-R growth gap, meaning that, were it not for that
variable, we would predict the presidential growth gap to be even larger.
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2.4.2 Results
2.4 shows the univariate results for various combinations of the state government
partisanship variables. The share of Democratic governors does not explain the D-R
presidential growth gap. Neither do the share of Democratic state legislatures or unified
Democratic state governments. More than that, these variables even “push in the wrong
direction” (BW p. 1037): the explained D-R presidential growth gap is negative and
large in magnitude in columns (1) to (5), though only attains statistical significance in
some specifications. Our point estimates (party-specific lag weights) for the explained
portion of the D-R presidential growth gap are large: -0.31 for Democratic governors
alone, increasing to -0.42, -0.54 and -0.60 for combinations capturing more aspects of
state government control (Democratic governors and legislatures together, and Democratic
governors and unified governments together, and Democratic governors, legislatures and
unified governments together). An explained portion of -0.42 means that, absent the effect
of the share of Democratic governors, we predict the D-R presidential growth gap would
have been 2.18 percentage points rather than the actual D-R gap of 1.76 (a difference of
0.42 percentage points).7
Multivariate results including oil price shocks, defense expenditure shocks, and
other variables proposed by BW, together with the share of Democratic governors indicate
that again the share of Democratic governors explained a negative fraction of the D-R
7The baseline D-R growth gap for our sample is 176 basis points, not 179 as quoted in BW, because we
consider the period 1950:I-2015:I rather than 1949:II-2013:I. Some early observations are lost due to the lags
included in the VAR model of BW. This also happens for BW when they consider the Baa-Aaa spread and the
Baker et al. (2013) uncertainty index, for which VAR models are also used. A few shocks like the Hamilton
shock are available slightly earlier (1949:II) because they are not constructed by BW using the VAR. We also
extended the dataset through to 2015:I for most of our models, though inferences are very similar if we end
the sample at the same time as BW.
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growth gap, though the effects lack statistical significance at conventional levels using
BW’s lag structure (2.5).
The effects are sensitive to the assumption about when a newly elected politician
can begin to affect the economy. BW assume this occurs during the first full quarter in
office (April-June after the presidential elections in November), attributing the quarter of
the election (October-December) and the quarter during which the inauguration takes place
(January-March) to the predecessor. The explained proportions of the D-R presidential
growth gap for the state politics variables are negative, large in magnitude, and statistically
significant when we instead assume that a new politician starts to have an effect in the
quarter of the election, or in the quarter of the inauguration (2.6). For lags longer than
considered in BW, the explained portions of the D-R presidential growth gap become
somewhat smaller in magnitude and attain lower levels of statistical significance, though
remain large and negative in all specifications and statistically significant in some of them.
There is no accepted convention for choosing when newly elected politicians begin
to affect the economy. BW acknowledge (p. 1017) that their assumption, chosen “on a priori
grounds,” is the one that maximizes the size of the D-R gap while recognizing that political
scientists usually prefer lags of a year or more (Bartels 2008; Comiskey and Marsh 2012).
Kane (2017) takes issue with this assumption and shows that the D-R growth gap becomes
much smaller when considering longer lags. We do not take a stand on which lag choice is
the most suitable. It is certainly true that policies are implemented with a lag. On the other
hand, when uncertainty about the election outcome is resolved, agents immediately begin
to update their expectations about future economic conditions, even before any policies
have been implemented. Consequently, their decisions may change immediately (or even
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before, if the result is anticipated) following the election (Snowberg 2007a and 2007b,
Gerber and Huber 2009, Julio and Yook 2012, Jens 2017, Falk and Shelton 2018).8 Of
course, this all assumes a causal interpretation for the observed correlation. It is equally
plausible that GDP growth rates leading up to elections influence voting behavior (Pastor
and Veronesi 2017). In any event, the share of Democratic governors does not explain
the D-R presidential growth gap, confirming that the Democratic performance advantage
with respect to partisan balance of the state governments is a separate effect from the D-R
presidential growth gap. At one extreme, it appears to be an independent effect on top of
the D-R presidential gap; at the other, it even works in the opposite direction, suggesting
that the D-R gap might have been even bigger otherwise.
2.5 Economic performance and government partisanship
in the US states
If Democratic state governments are associated with higher economic growth at the
national level, then we should also expect individual states to grow faster under Democratic
state politicians. While the link between state politicians and national GDP growth has
been largely unexplored, there is a large literature on the effects of government partisan
control on economic performance and policies in the US states (for a survey, see Potrafke
2018). In previous studies, many outcome variables such as income per capita, tax rates,
public expenditure, etc., were regressed on variables measuring the party affiliation of the
governor and majorities in the State House and State Senate. Chang et al. (2009) find, for
8See also BWs online appendix 5 for durable good consumption and investment.
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example, that state real personal income growth over the period 1951-2004 was higher
under Democratic than Republican governors, especially in the first part of a legislative
period.
2.5.1 Annual income per capita growth: some new empirical evidence
We examine whether state annual personal income per capita growth in the US
states was higher under Democratic than Republican state governments (there is no data
for GDP at the state level available until the 1960s). Unlike Chang et al. (2009), we pay
particular attention to highly populated states such as California, Texas and New York
because these large states contribute more to the national GDP. Because states with large
populations and crystal-clear political majorities are central to our study, we cannot use
regression discontinuity designs (RDD) and rather use descriptive statistics and estimate
linear panel data models that report correlations between state government partisanship and
state annual personal income per capita growth.
We use annual data for state real personal income per capita growth across the 50
US states over the period 1949-2016 (inferences are very similar for the shorter sample
of 1949-2012 considered in BW). With annual rather than quarterly data, we assume new
politicians take effect the year of their inauguration (almost always in January of that year).
Descriptive statistics (2.7) show that state annual real personal income per capita growth
was on average higher under Democratic governors than under Republican governors
(2.02 percent versus 1.79 percent, t-statistic 2.27), and higher under Democratic unified
governments than under Republican unified governments (2.16 percent versus 1.79 percent,
t-statistic 2.47). The difference between Democratic and Republican legislatures does not
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turn out to be statistically significant.
We split the sample based on population and consider the top 10 states by population
(in 2016) which account for about 54 percent of the population (California, Texas, New York,
Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Georgia, North Carolina, Michigan) and the remaining
40 states. The results show that, in the top 10 states, state income per capita growth was
on average higher under Democratic than Republican governors (2.06 percent versus
1.65 percent). The differences were also pronounced under Democratic and Republican
legislatures (2.07 percent versus 1.69) and, especially, under unified state governments
(2.24 percent versus 1.63 percent). These differences are larger than for the bottom 40 states,
suggesting that the more populated states may be making a disproportionate contribution.
We estimate linear panel data models regressing state income per capita growth on
state government partisanship variables including state and year fixed effects. The results in
2.8 show that growth in state income per capita was around 0.16 percentage points higher
under Democratic than Republican governors, or 0.24 percentage points if we weight by
population. In both cases the estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
For legislatures, income per capita growth was around 0.30 percentage points (0.44 when
weighting) higher when Democrats had control relative to when Republicans had control
(statistically significant at the 1 percent level). When there was a Democratic unified state
government, state income per capita growth was about 0.15 percentage points (0.21 when
weighting) higher than when the governorship and the legislature were not held by the
same party. When there was a Republican unified state government, state income per
capita growth was about 0.24 percentage points (0.30 when weighting) lower than when the
governorship and the legislature were not held by the same party (statistically significant at
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the 5 and 1 percent levels).
When we estimate the same panel regressions looking only at the top 10 and bottom
40 states in terms of population (columns 3 to 6 of 2.8), the results are similar for both
size categories. For the top 10 states, the differences are quite pronounced, especially for
legislatures, often attaining statistical significance despite the small number of states.9 This
suggests that those states that matter the most for national GDP growth indeed experience
pronounced differences in state-level performance under Democratic and Republican state
governments. It does not, however, establish causality or identify which policies, if any,
may have been responsible.
2.5.2 Southern Democrats and changes in party ideology
That the national economy grows faster when Democrats control more state gov-
ernments is, of course, not necessarily a causal relationship – the government partisanship
variable is endogenous and, indeed, the mechanism proposed by Pastor and Veronesi (2017)
may well also apply at the state level. In addition, any causal effect need not be thanks to
the “modern” Democratic Party. As noted by BW (page 1017), the D-R presidential growth
gap gets smaller over time. At the same time, the platforms and constituencies of both
parties have seen fundamental changes since the immediate post-WWII period (McCarty et
al. 2006, Gentzkow et al. 2016). The most notable change was the large-scale realignment
of the “Solid South” away from the Democratic Party towards the Republican Party through
the 1960s to the 1990s. We find that, while the South certainly contributes to our findings,
it was not alone in experiencing differences in state income per capita growth under the
9Because of the small number of states when looking at subsets of the 50 states, we report heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors as well.
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two parties, for both presidents and governors (2.9).
2.6 Conclusions
We examine the extent to which party politics at the US state level explain national
GDP growth. The results are stark: higher national GDP growth was generated when
more US states had Democratic governors and unified Democratic state governments. Over
the period 1949:II-2017:I, a one standard deviation increase in the share of governorships
controlled by the Democratic Party (unified Democratic state governments) was associated
with a 0.57 percentage point (0.77 percentage point) increase in the real national GDP
growth rate. Moreover, this Democratic performance advantage with respect to the state
governments occurs in addition to the D-R presidential growth gap, suggesting that there
is a more generalized Democratic performance advantage that extends beyond just the
presidency.
Our results have three important implications for future research. The first is
whether Democratic or Republican state governments may have been associated with pro-
nounced long-run growth in real personal income per capita and GDP. Short run economic
performance is different from long run growth. Also, it does not necessarily reflect “good”
governance – growth-oriented policies must be traded off against other considerations (e.
g., stimulus packages versus budget consolidation). Different constituencies have different
priorities, and elected officials are tasked with representing these interests (see, for example,
Kitschelt 2000).
Second, studies examining the effects of government ideology on national economic
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performance in federal states may benefit by considering party politics at the lower juris-
dictional level. This includes industrialized countries such as Canada and Germany but
also somewhat less developed countries such as India. For example, there may have been
strategic interaction and interjurisdictional competition across state governments due to
fiscal externalities.
Third, the D-R presidential growth gap remains puzzling. Our results suggest that
the Democratic advantage investigated by BW extends to the state level, as well. Rather than
explaining the D-R presidential growth gap, however, the state government phenomenon
appears to exist in addition to it. Future research should continue to explore the channels
through which the relationship between Democratic politicians and GDP growth at various
levels arises and the extent to which, if at all, Democratic policies may have caused higher
GDP growth.
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Figure 2.1: The share of state governorships controlled by the Democratic Party was high
(low) at the beginning of Democratic (Republican) presidential terms and tended to decrease
(increase) drastically during the course of the terms. Source: Data on state level election results
are taken from a variety of publicly available online sources, including David Leips Atlas of US
Presidential Elections, Carl Klarners datasets (2013a), state agency websites.
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Figure 2.2: The share of state legislatures that were controlled by the incumbent presidents
party also decreased in the course of the presidential term (though not as consistently and
not as drastically as in the case of control of governorships). Source: Klarner (2013b), own
calculations.
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Figure 2.3: Newly elected presidents enjoyed many copartisan governors and unified state
governments but tended to lose them over time. Source: Klarner (2013a, b), own calculations.
114
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics on real national quarterly GDP growth (annualized) under
Democratic and Republican presidents (1949:II-2017:I).
No. of
quarters
Avg. annualized
GDP growth
Dem.
gov.
Dem.
leg.
Rep.
leg.
Dem.
unified
govts.
Rep.
unified
govts.
Dem. pres. 128 4.05 0.51 0.47 0.33 0.33 0.25
First year 32 4.47 0.56 0.54 0.26 0.39 0.19
Second year 32 4.67 0.55 0.53 0.26 0.38 0.19
Third year 32 3.49 0.46 0.41 0.39 0.28 0.30
Last year 32 3.57 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.28 0.31
Rep. pres 144 2.54 0.52 0.52 0.27 0.32 0.18
First year 36 0.67 0.46 0.46 0.32 0.27 0.24
Second year 36 2.28 0.47 0.47 0.32 0.28 0.23
Third year 36 4.37 0.58 0.57 0.21 0.37 0.14
Last year 36 2.86 0.57 0.57 0.21 0.35 0.13
Overall 272 3.25 0.51 0.50 0.30 0.32 0.22
Notes: Government ideology measured with one lag (BW).
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Table 2.2: State government ideology predicting real national (annualized) quarterly GDP
growth (1949:II-2017:I).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dem. pres. 1.50∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 1.59∗∗ 1.50∗∗ 0.91 1.70
(0.63) (0.61) (0.63) (0.62) (1.87) (1.35)
Dem. governors 4.39∗∗ 4.72∗∗∗
(1.92) (1.65)
Dem. leg. 7.25∗∗ 7.01∗∗
(3.64) (3.22)
Rep. leg. 4.49 3.53
(3.00) (2.56)
Dem. unified govts. 5.91∗∗ 4.86∗∗
(2.49) (2.12)
Rep. unified govts. 0.33 -1.06
(2.09) (2.12)
Dem. pres.
×Dem. gov.
5.27∗∗
(2.20)
Rep. pres.
×Dem. governors
3.98
(2.81)
Dem. pres.
×Dem. unified govts.
5.05∗∗
(2.26)
Rep. pres.
×Dem. unified govts.
5.91∗
(3.32)
Cons. 2.54∗∗∗ 1.00 -1.67 1.27 0.09 -2.02 1.20 0.48 0.67
(0.45) (0.98) (2.62) (1.15) (0.92) (2.24) (0.99) (1.44) (1.11)
R2 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Notes: Dependent variable is quarterly GDP growth (annualized). Newey-West (6 lag) standard errors in
parentheses. N = 272. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01..
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Table 2.3: State government ideology predicting real national quarterly GDP growth (annual-
ized) for alternative lags of state government ideology (1949:II-2017:I).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No. of state govt. ideology lags -2 -1 0 1 (BW) 2 3 4
Governors
Dem. pres. 0.84 0.86 1.33∗∗ 1.57∗∗ 1.15∗ 0.73 0.42
(0.62) (0.61) (0.58) (0.61) (0.61) (0.61) (0.66)
Dem. governors 3.57∗ 4.04∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 4.72∗∗∗ 3.92∗∗ 3.69∗ 2.75
(1.98) (1.83) (1.68) (1.65) (1.77) (1.92) (1.94)
Cons. 1.05 0.79 0.13 0.09 0.70 1.02 1.64
(0.99) (0.93) (0.85) (0.92) (1.00) (1.06) (1.11)
Legislatures
Dem. pres. 0.86 0.89 1.37∗∗ 1.59∗∗ 1.14∗ 0.68 0.33
(0.62) (0.62) (0.60) (0.63) (0.63) (0.61) (0.65)
Dem. leg. 1.36 2.60 5.03∗ 7.01∗∗ 6.03∗ 5.49 4.83
(3.06) (2.80) (2.75) (3.22) (3.37) (3.57) (3.52)
Rep. leg. -0.32 0.45 1.79 3.53 3.41 3.43 3.91
(2.71) (2.31) (2.13) (2.56) (2.69) (2.86) (2.91)
Cons. 2.28 1.43 -0.41 -2.02 -1.29 -0.81 -0.46
(2.14) (1.93) (1.89) (2.24) (2.37) (2.56) (2.57)
Unified governments
Dem. pres. 0.80 0.79 1.29∗∗ 1.50∗∗ 1.00 0.53 0.14
(0.62) (0.61) (0.59) (0.62) (0.62) (0.61) (0.64)
Dem. unified gov. 3.25 4.14∗ 4.36∗∗ 4.86∗∗ 5.16∗∗ 5.25∗∗ 5.16∗∗
(2.24) (2.14) (2.04) (2.12) (2.27) (2.43) (2.55)
Rep. unified gov. -0.93 -0.70 -1.59 -1.06 0.09 0.63 1.92
(2.05) (2.07) (1.99) (2.12) (2.07) (1.97) (2.14)
Cons. 2.05∗∗ 1.71∗ 1.58∗ 1.20 1.09 1.16 1.09
(0.90) (0.94) (0.94) (0.99) (1.01) (1.06) (1.13)
N 270 271 272 272 272 272 272
Notes: Dependent variable is average quarterly GDP growth (annualized). Newey-West (6 lag)
standard errors in parentheses. 0 lags correspond to assigning the quarter during which a politician is
inaugurated to the incoming politician. 1 lag is the BW baseline, where politicians are assigned their
first full quarter in office. All political variables in a single regression assume the same lag. ∗ p< 0.10,
∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Table 2.4: Explaining the D-R-growth gap with state government ideology. BW model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Begin 1950:I 1950:I 1950:I 1950:I 1950:I 1950:I
End 2015:I 2015:I 2015:I 2015:I 2015:I 2015:I
Total D-R gap 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)
Dem. governors -0.23 -0.16 -0.15 -0.40
(0.17) (0.22) (0.35) (0.34)
Dem. leg. -0.22 -0.16 -0.37
(0.17) (0.22) (0.24)
Rep. leg. -0.00 0.04
(0.27) (0.26)
Dem. unified gov. 0.02 0.07 0.25
(0.07) (0.13) (0.20)
Rep. unified gov. -0.36 -0.32
(0.19) (0.20)
Explained D-R gap
(common lag weights)
-0.23 -0.22 -0.34 -0.28 -0.40 -0.52
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.23) (0.28)
Explained D-R gap
(party-specific lag weights)
-0.31 -0.23 -0.39 -0.42 -0.54 -0.60
(0.17) (0.19) (0.16) (0.26) (0.26) (0.29)
p-value 0.51 0.28 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00
Notes: Total D-R gap refers to the difference in average growth between Democratic and Republi-
can presidents for the corresponding time period. The explained D-R gap is computed as described
in the text using the combination of shocks indicated. With common lag weights, distributed lag
weights are assumed the same for Democratic and Republican presidents; with party-specific lag
weights, they can be different. Newey-West (6 lag) standard errors in parentheses. The p-value
corresponds to F-tests for equality between the party-specific distributed lag coefficients.
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Table 2.5: Explaining the D-R-growth gap with the share of Democratic governors. Multivariate
results. BW model.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Begin 1950:I 1950:III 1950:III 1950:III 1950:III
End 2013:I 2013:I 2013:I 2013:I 2007:IV
Total D-R gap 1.90 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.91
(0.68) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62)
Oil (Hamilton) 0.47 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.17
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
Defense (Ramey) 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
TFP (BW) 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Baa-Aaa spread -0.03
(0.10)
Uncertainty (BBD) -0.02
(0.05)
Taxes (RR) -0.01
(0.01)
Dem. governors -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12)
Explained D-R gap
(common lag weights)
0.46 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.56
(0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.19) (0.16)
Explained D-R gap
(party-specific lag weights)
0.48 0.79 0.61 0.75 0.45
(0.45) (0.48) (0.55) (0.50) (0.50)
Notes: Total D-R gap refers to the difference in average growth between Democratic and
Republican presidents for the corresponding time period. The explained D-R gap is computed
as described in the text using the combination of shocks indicated. With common lag weights,
distributed lag weights are assumed the same for Democratic and Republican presidents; with party-
specific lag weights, they can be different. Newey-West (6 lag) standard errors in parentheses. The
p-value corresponds to F-tests for equality between the party-specific distributed lag coefficients.
Similar to BW, Table 8.
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Table 2.6: Explaining the D-R-growth gap with state government ideology and alternative lag
assumptions. BW model.
Explained D-R gap; distributed lag model
No.
lags
Shocks
included
Sample
period Total D-R gap Common Party-specific p-value
-2 DG 1950:I-2015:I 0.98 (0.68) -0.33 (0.17) -0.40 (0.18) 0.56
DG DL RL 1950:I-2015:I 0.98 (0.68) -0.36 (0.20) -0.51 (0.23) 0.02
DG DUG RUG 1950:I-2015:I 0.98 (0.68) -0.42 (0.21) -0.52 (0.24) 0.00
-1 DG 1950:I-2015:I 0.99 (0.67) -0.33 (0.19) -0.43 (0.19) 0.43
DG DL RL 1950:I-2015:I 0.99 (0.67) -0.41 (0.23) -0.58 (0.25) 0.02
DG DUG RUG 1950:I-2015:I 0.99 (0.67) -0.45 (0.22) -0.57 (0.23) 0.02
0 DG 1950:I-2015:I 1.48 (0.65) -0.38 (0.18) -0.45 (0.18) 0.25
DG DL RL 1950:I-2015:I 1.48 (0.65) -0.40 (0.20) -0.50 (0.23) 0.00
DG DUG RUG 1950:I-2015:I 1.48 (0.65) -0.47 (0.23) -0.58 (0.25) 0.00
1 (BW) DG 1950:I-2015:I 1.76 (0.66) -0.23 (0.17) -0.31 (0.19) 0.51
DG DL RL 1950:I-2015:I 1.76 (0.66) -0.28 (0.21) -0.42 (0.26) 0.05
DG DUG RUG 1950:I-2015:I 1.76 (0.66) -0.40 (0.23) -0.54 (0.26) 0.00
2 DG 1950:I-2015:I 1.55 (0.66) -0.10 (0.16) -0.19 (0.18) 0.46
DG DL RL 1950:I-2015:I 1.55 (0.66) -0.16 (0.20) -0.28 (0.21) 0.30
DG DUG RUG 1950:I-2015:I 1.55 (0.66) -0.18 (0.22) -0.33 (0.23) 0.00
3 DG 1950:I-2015:I 1.34 (0.65) -0.11 (0.15) -0.19 (0.17) 0.71
DG DL RL 1950:I-2015:I 1.34 (0.65) -0.19 (0.19) -0.27 (0.19) 0.37
DG DUG RUG 1950:I-2015:I 1.34 (0.65) -0.15 (0.21) -0.30 (0.21) 0.00
Notes: Number of lags refers to when the effect of incoming politicians is assumed to start, relative to the
quarter in which they are inaugurated. DG, DL, DUG (RG, RL, RUG) refer to Democratic (Republican)
governors, legislatures and unified governments. Newey-West standard errors (6 lags) in parentheses. The
p-values corresponds to F-tests of equality of coefficients across party-specific and common lag weight
specifications. See also Table 2.5.
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Table 2.7: Annual growth in states income per capita under Democratic and Republican state
governments.
Income per capita growth
(1949-2016) in percent
All states Top 10 Bottom 40
Overall 1.91 (3396) 1.87 (680) 1.92 (2716)
Dem. governor 2.02 (1793) 2.06 (359) 2.01 (1434)
Rep. governor 1.79 (1577) 1.65 (321) 1.82 (1256)
Independent/other 1.18 (26) - (0) 1.18 (28)
D-R difference 0.24[2.27] 0.42 [1.89] 0.19 [1.61]
Dem. legislature 2.02 (1631) 2.07 (319) 2.01 (1312)
Rep. legislature 1.81 (1104) 1.71 (213) 1.83 (891)
Split. legislature 1.78 (619) 1.69 (151) 1.81 (468)
D-R difference 0.21 [1.62] 0.37 [1.21] 0.17 [1.19]
Dem. unified government 2.16 (1073) 2.24 (229) 2.14 (844)
Rep. unified government 1.79 (735) 1.63 (158) 1.83 (577)
Non unified government 1.79 (1520) 1.71 (293) 1.81 (1227)
D-R difference 0.37 [2.47] 0.61 [2.01] 0.30 [1.79]
Average values by state government partisanship. Number of state-years in parenthe-
ses. Nebraska is not included with respect to legislatures, since it has a nonpartisan
unicameral legislature. For the D-R differences, the t-statistic (in square brackets) is
calculated by regressing the outcome on state government dummy variables, cluster-
ing at the state level. The top 10 states by population (in 2016) are CA, TX, FL, NY,
IL, PA, OH, GA, NC, MI, and account for about 54 percent of the population.
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Table 2.8: Annual growth in states income per capita under Democratic and Republican state
governments.
Income per capita growth (1949-2016)
All states Top 10 Bottom 40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Governors
Dem. 0.16∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.18 0.29 0.15∗ 0.17∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09)
[0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.08]
Indep. -0.16 -0.02 - - -0.19 -0.18
(0.33) (0.21) - - (0.34) (0.29)
- - [0.37] [0.32]
R2 0.43 0.62 0.74 0.74 0.39 0.54
N 3396 3396 680 680 2716 2716
Legislatures
Dem. 0.30∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.20 0.30∗∗
(0.11) (0.13) (0.19) (0.20) (0.12) (0.10)
[0.19] [0.19] [0.17] [0.12]
Split 0.18 0.36∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.09 0.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12)
[0.18] [0.18] [0.19] [0.13]
R2 0.43 0.63 0.74 0.74 0.40 0.55
N 3328 3328 680 680 2648 2648
Unified governments
Dem. 0.15∗ 0.21∗ 0.07 0.20 0.16 0.21∗∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.16) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09)
[0.15] [0.15] [0.11] [0.09]
Rep. -0.24∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -0.38∗ -0.35∗ -0.19 -0.25∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
[0.18] [0.18] [0.18] [0.12]
R2 0.43 0.63 0.74 0.74 0.40 0.55
N 3328 3328 680 680 2648 2648
Pop. weighted Y Y Y
Notes: State and year fixed effects included. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses,
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in square brackets (asterisks based on the more conservative
standard errors). Nebraska is excluded from the legislature and unified government regressions, since
it has a nonpartisan unicameral legislature. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Table 2.9: Panel regression results. Annual growth in real state income per capita under
Democratic and Republican governors and presidents, by region.
Income per capita growth (1949-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
South 2.01*** 1.71*** 1.55*** 1.78*** 1.48*** 1.33***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14)
West 1.46*** 1.72*** 1.53*** 1.18*** 1.44*** 1.15***
(0.08) (0.12) (0.14) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
Northeast 1.76*** 2.16*** 1.93*** 1.73*** 2.19*** 2.02***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Midwest 1.74*** 1.63*** 1.55*** 1.38*** 1.53*** 1.24***
(0.18) (0.09) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15)
Dem. pres.
×South
0.28** 0.31** 0.21 0.28*
(0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
Dem. pres.
×West
0.40** 0.41** 0.73*** 0.72***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16)
Dem. pres.
×Northeast
0.49*** 0.50*** 0.38*** 0.32***
(0.11) (0.14) (0.06) (0.08)
Dem. pres.
×Midwest
0.16 0.18 0.57*** 0.59***
(0.28) (0.29) (0.18) (0.21)
Dem. gov.
×South
0.64*** 0.66*** 0.70*** 0.72***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.14) (0.15)
Dem. gov.
×West
-0.12 -0.11 0.19 0.06
(0.18) (0.17) (0.20) (0.12)
Dem. gov.
×Northeast
-0.32* -0.34* -0.58*** -0.55***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
Dem. gov.
×Midwest
0.45*** 0.46*** 0.29 0.32
(0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.22)
R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.31
Pop. weighted Y Y Y
Notes: Variables for independent governors also included, omitted from table; constant excluded
from regression to avoid collinearity. Standard errors clustered at state level. N = 3396. ∗ p< 0.10,
∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< .01.
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Chapter 3
Electoral competition under
best-worst voting rules
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Abstract: We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-
Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which each voter is
endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each voter votes in favour of their
most preferred candidate and against their least preferred. The importance of positive and
negative votes in calculating a candidate’s net score may be different, so that a negative vote
and a positive vote need not cancel out exactly. These rules combine the first-place seeking
incentives of plurality with the incentives to avoid being ranked last of antiplurality. We
show that, in our simple model, arbitrary best-worst rules admit equilibria, which (except
for three candidates) are nonconvergent if and only if the importance of a positive vote
exceeds that of a negative vote. The set of equilibria in the latter case is very similar to that
of plurality, except the platforms are less extreme due to the moderating effect of negative
votes. Moreover: (i) any degree of dispersion between plurality, at one extreme, and full
convergence, at the other, can be attained for the correct choice of the weights; and, (ii)
when they exist (and there are at least five candidates), there always exist nonconvergent
equilibria in which none of the most extreme candidates receive the most electoral support.
3.1 Introduction
Hotelling’s (1929) “Main Street” model of spatial competition between firms has—
most notably thanks to its adaptation by Downs (1957) to ideological competition among
political parties—enjoyed a significant presence in the voting literature. In the classical
model, there is a society of voters whose ideal policy platforms lie along the left-right
political spectrum. A set of exogenously given political candidates or parties choose
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platforms to advocate so as to maximise their support from the voters, who vote for the
candidate with the platform nearest to his or her personal ideal platform.
Most such studies of Downsian competition have focused on situations in which
elections are held under the voting system known as plurality rule. This is the simplest
system where voters have one vote each, which they cast for their favourite candidate,
and whoever gets the most votes wins. Under plurality, voters’ second, third and other
preferences—most importantly for this paper, their last place preferences—do not matter.
However, voting systems, both used in practice and studied theoretically, come in many
varieties. Many of them do take into account voters’ partial or full ranking of candidates
when producing a winner. These include, among others, approval voting, Borda count, and
single transferable vote. When the preferences beyond first matter, candidates’ incentives
change, and we expect equilibrium outcomes to vary as well. In this paper, we analyze
the equilibrium properties of a largely overlooked class of voting rules, which combine
positive and negative voting, and are referred to as best-worst rules (Garcı´a-Lapresta et
al., 2010). Under these rules, each voter casts one positive and one negative vote and a
candidate’s total score is the weighted difference of the number of positive votes and the
number of negative votes. We allow the weight of a negative vote to be different from that
of a positive vote and, hence, this class of voting systems includes as special cases plurality,
anti-plurality, and the system in which positive and negative votes are of equal importance.1
The main result of this paper is that, in a simple Hotelling-Downs model with
uniformly distributed,2 sincere voters and no exit or entry, there is a close link between the
pure-strategy equilibria of general best-worst rules and those of plurality, which is well
1Also known as “single-positive-and-single-negative” voting (Myerson, 1999).
2We discuss a generalisation of the uniformity assumption in Section 3.5.
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known to admit divergent equilibria in which candidates adopt a range of ideologically
diverse positions (Eaton and Lipsey, 1975; Denzau et al., 1985). When the importance of
a positive vote exceeds that of a negative vote, equilibria take the same general form as
those of plurality, with divergent policy platforms advocated. However, the key difference
is that, while differentiated, the equilibrium platforms for the best-worst rules exhibit
less dispersion. Indeed, these rules present candidates with a clear centrifugal motive to
seek first-place rankings, as occurs under plurality, but with the simultaneous incentive to
avoid being the most unpopular candidate and receiving negative votes. This last property
encourages a degree of policy moderation—adopting extreme platforms is discouraged as
doing so is likely to single oneself out as a target for the negative votes of citizens at the
opposite end of the ideological spectrum. As the importance of a negative vote increases
relative to that of a positive vote, the equilibrium platforms move inwards towards the
median voter’s ideal platform. Eventually all platforms merge at the median as a negative
vote reaches parity with a positive vote (i.e., one negative vote cancels out one positive
vote exactly). When a negative vote becomes more important than a positive vote, only
convergent equilibria exist, with no policy differentiation.
Describing the equilibrium properties of different voting systems is an important
task (Cox, 1985, 1987; Grofman and Lijphart, 1986; Myerson and Weber, 1993; Myerson,
1999; Cahan and Slinko, 2017). When choosing between voting rules, first of all, we would
like to know whether or not equilibria exist—their absence may lead to permanent instability
and a lack of predictability of outcomes. Second, if they exist, an electoral designer would
prefer a rule that admits equilibria with desirable properties. The main consideration here
is a tradeoff between discouraging extremism and promoting fair representation—it is
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undesirable if candidates are incentivised to adopt extremist platforms rather than more
centrist platforms, while at the same time the rationale for voting in the first place is to
provide citizens with political representation of their varied interests. Besides the platforms
that are advocated, which platforms are likely to receive the most support also matters for
similar reasons.
Our results show that best-worst rules do well on all counts. They admit nonconver-
gent equilibria, offering voters a choice over distinct platforms and avoiding Hotelling’s
“excessive sameness”. At the same time, the perhaps excessive extremism associated with
plurality (Cox, 1987, 1985; Myerson and Weber, 1993; Laslier and Maniquet, 2010) is mod-
erated. Indeed, depending on the weight placed on a negative vote, we may have any level
of dispersion of platforms between that of plurality, at one extreme, and full convergence
of platforms, at the other. Moreover, the candidates that adopt the most extreme positions
in equilibrium never obtain a strictly higher vote share than any other candidate—in fact,
when there are at least five candidates, there always exist NCNE in which the most extreme
candidates receive a strictly smaller vote share than at least one less extreme candidate.
Finally, best-worst voting rules have the additional advantage that they are simple and easily
implementable, requiring only that voters list their first and last choices and not a tedious
full ranking.
Best-worst voting itself has not been used in practice, but the idea of voting against
candidates in one form or another has been around for some time. Boehm (1976) in an
unpublished essay suggested that voters in an election be allowed either to cast a vote for
or against a candidate, but not both. A candidate’s “negative” votes would be subtracted
from his “positive” votes to determine his net vote, and the candidate with the highest net
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vote would win.3 Boehm—and many others after him (see, e.g., Leef, 2014)—argued that
the introduction of negative votes in United States presidential elections would force the
candidates to appeal to voters with positive programs, rather than just fill the airwaves with
ads attacking other candidates, sowing doubt among their supporters. The rule suggested
by Boehm is now known as negative voting (Brams, 1983). Anti-plurality voting is a
similar method in which each voter votes against a single candidate, and the candidate with
the fewest votes against wins. In other words, anti-plurality determines who among the
candidates is the least unpopular.4
The use of some form of negative voting in elections is not so uncommon. For
example, Nevada gives voters the option to vote against all candidates by having a “None
of these candidates” option on the ballot. Prior to 2000, Lithuanian voters were allowed
voters to express approval, neutrality or disapproval of candidates in the proportional
representation part of their parliamentary elections (Renwick and Pilet, 2016). Latvia does
the same in allocating a party’s European Parliament seats to individual candidates from
the party list.5
A voting system in which voters cast both positive and negative votes, as occurs
under best-worst rules, may be even more advantageous. It can give a fighting chance to
major or minor centrist parties—it is not unthinkable that people on the extreme left will
vote for a leftist candidate and against a right-wing one, while the right-wing voters will do
the opposite. Their votes will cancel out and a centrist candidate will be elected.6 Indeed,
3Presumably, if the highest net vote is negative, then nobody is elected.
4Anti-plurality is also sometimes referred to as negative voting as well as “veto” (Kang, 2010).
5See the following training course for election observers: https://www.cvk.lv/pub/public/30083.html.
6See Kang (2010) for an account of more costs, benefits and tradeoffs associated with negative voting.
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roughly speaking, this is directly in the spirit of our main results.7
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 3.2 we outline some
literature related to this work; in Section 3.3 we present the model; in Section 3.4 we present
our main results; Section 3.5 discusses a few of the assumptions and the generalisability of
the results; and, Section 3.6 provides our concluding remarks. A few minor and auxiliary
results are presented in the Appendix.
3.2 Related literature
Best-worst rules specifically and notions related to them have been considered
before in other contexts. The idea that the best and worst alternatives play a special role
in the decision process has been prominent in decision theory. For example, the Arrow-
Hurwicz (1972) criterion for choice under uncertainty takes a weighted average of the best
and worst expected value/utility outcomes and does not take into account intermediate
outcomes, and Marley and Louviere (2005) look at probabilistic discrete choice models
through the best-worst lense.
Garcı´a-Lapresta et al. (2010) provide an axiomatic characterisation of the class of
best-worst voting rules considered in this paper. Alcantud and Laruelle (2014) characterise
a related voting rule in which, for each candidate, voters may express approval, indifference,
or disapproval. This rule is also studied in Felsenthal (1989) from the perspective of
7We do not model it here, but there may be further arguments in favour—e.g., the number of ways in
which voters can express themselves is further diversified, which could increase turnout by appealing to voters
who are enticed more by the ability to vote against a candidate than for one (Kang, 2010; Leef, 2014). In
an experimental setting, Baujard et al. (2014) find that French voters are generally positive about the use
of alternative and more expressive “evaluative” voting methods similar to best-worst rules. We leave these
considerations for future work.
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voter strategies. Joy and McMunigal (2016) believe that the current system of peremptory
challenges in the criminal justice system of the United States makes it easy to exclude
qualified African Americans jurors in the process of jury selection and propose that it be
replaced with a system of peremptory strikes and peremptory inclusions. In other words,
both the defense and the prosecution should be allowed to not just rule potential jurors out,
but also “rule them in”.
Baujard et al. (2014), during the first round of the 2012 French presidential election,
ran an experiment in which subjects were asked to vote for candidates using various
“evaluative voting” methods, which bear many similarities to the best-worst voting rules
considered in our paper. Voters “graded” candidates on a numerical scale: for example,
under one system they could assign each candidate 1 point, 0 points, or -1 points; under
another, they could assign 2 points, 1 point or 0 points. They documented an interesting
psychological effect: these systems were not treated the same, despite being mathematically
equivalent (see also Igersheim et al., 2016).
None of these papers, thus, look at how the incentives created by these voting
systems affect political competition. Given the very natural combination of negative and
positive voting embodied in the best-worst rules, it is surprising that, to the best of our
knowledge, they have been overlooked in the spatial competition literature. Plurality, a
special case, has of course been extensively discussed, and its equilibrium properties are
characterised in Eaton and Lipsey (1975) and Denzau et al. (1985). Anti-plurality is known
to allow convergent equilibria in which all candidates adopt the same policy platform, but
not to allow nonconvergent equilibria (Cox, 1987).
The two most relevant papers to this research are Cox (1987) and Cahan and Slinko
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(2017). Both are concerned with Nash equilibria under the class of voting rules known as
general scoring rules, of which the best-worst rules are a subclass. Cox (1987) characterised
all scoring rules that have convergent Nash equilibria, which leads to a straightforward
description of all best-worst rules allowing convergent equilibria, as we will describe
in Section 3.4. However, Cox’s theorem says nothing about the possibility of divergent
equilibria, which is the focus of Cahan and Slinko (2017), and also this paper.
Cahan and Slinko (2017) investigate the existence and properties of nonconvergent
equilibria under general scoring rules. In some subclasses of scoring rules—in particular,
those whose score vector is convex—they managed to characterise all rules that allow Nash
equilibria. These rules appear to be truncated variants of the Borda rule. This result is,
however, inapplicable to the best-worst rules, whose score vectors are neither convex nor
concave. A general characterisation of scoring rules that allow equilibria remains an open
question.
3.3 The model
There is a unit mass of voters with ideal positions distributed uniformly on the
interval [0,1], the issue space.8 There are m candidates—candidate i’s position is xi, and
a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ [0,1]m describes the platforms of all the candidates.
A strategy profile implies a set of distinct occupied positions, x1 < x2 < .. . < xq. We
denote by ni the number of candidates at occupied position xi and we will sometimes use
the alternative notation for a strategy profile, x = ((x1,n1), . . . ,(xq,nq)), which gives the
8See Section 3.5 for a discussion on limitations, justifications and generalisations of the uniform distribu-
tion assumption.
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location and number of candidates at each occupied position rather than each individual
candidate’s position.
We will use notation [n] = {1, . . . ,n} and if I = [a,b] is an interval, then `(I) = b−a
is the length of the interval. We assume sincere voters with single-peaked, symmetric utility
functions who, hence, rank candidates according to the distance between their advocated
platform and the voter’s ideal position. Voters who are indifferent between candidates
decide on a strict ranking by fair lottery.
A best-worst voting rule can be described as follows: a first-place ranking earns a
candidate a normalised 1 point, while a last-place ranking earns the candidate −c points,
where c≥ 0. Being ranked anywhere other than first or last by a voter earns a candidate
nothing. The magnitude of c describes the relative importance of the positive vote relative
to the negative vote, which is the parameter of interest here. Thus, a rule can be described
by a pair of numbers s = (c,m), where m is the number of candidates.9
Candidate i’s score is the weighted difference between the number of positive votes
and the number of negative votes received, denoted vi(x). Candidates choose positions
simultaneously so as to maximise vi(x).10 Our equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies. Profile x∗=(x∗1, . . . ,x
∗
m) is an equilibrium if and only if vi(x
∗)≥ vi(xi,x∗−i)
for all i ∈ [m] and for all xi ∈ [0,1], where (xi,x∗−i) = (x∗1, . . . ,x∗i−1,xi,x∗i+1, . . . ,x∗m). A
convergent Nash equilibrium (CNE) is an equilibrium in which all candidates adopt the
same platform, while in a non-convergent Nash equilibrium (NCNE), at least two of the
9As noted in the Introduction, best-worst rules belong to the class of general scoring rules. A scoring
rule is a vector s = (s1, . . . ,sm), where s1 ≥ ·· · ≥ sm, s1 > sm, and si is the number of points assigned to the
i-th ranked candidate in a voter’s ballot. A best-worst rule s = (c,m), then, is equivalent to scoring rule
s = (1,0, . . . ,0,−c).
10See Section 3.5 for a discussion of this assumption and plausible alternatives.
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platforms are distinct. The notation x+i and x
−
i refer to points xi+ ε and xi− ε, respectively,
for vanishingly small ε> 0.
3.4 Results
Our main result is a general characterisation of NCNE for rules s = (c,m) in The-
orem 3.4.3. Before we concentrate on NCNE, however, we should address the issue of
CNE—equilibria in which all candidates adopt the same platform. In fact, their characteri-
sation is straightforward, presented below in Proposition 3.4.1. This result follows directly
from Cox (1987), who characterised CNE for general scoring rules, a broad class of voting
rules to which best-worst rules belong.
Proposition 3.4.1 (Cox, 1987). A rule s = (c,m) admits CNE if and only if c≥ 1, in which
case the profile x = ((x1,m)) is a CNE for any x1 ∈
[
m−1+c
m(1+c) ,1− m−1+cm(1+c)
]
.
Proof. For x= ((x1,m)) to be a CNE, it should not be beneficial to deviate just to the left or
right of x1. That is, we have CNE if and only if: first, vi(x1−,x−i) = x1−c(1−x1)≤ 1−cm =
vi(x); and, second, vi(x1+,x−i) = 1−x1−cx1 ≤ vi(x). Together, these two conditions yield
the interval of possible CNE, which is nonempty if and only if c≥ 1.
Proposition 3.4.1 tells us that CNE can only exist if the weight on a positive vote
does not exceed that of a negative vote. In this case, a small deviation from the common
platform differentiates a candidate in a positive way for one side of the electorate, and
negatively for the other. The gain in terms of positive votes is not worth the damage due
to the negative votes that the candidate will now receive, so candidates will stay put at the
common platform. So CNE exist at any point of an interval centered at the median voter’s
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ideal position. As c increases, this interval expands, meaning that a wider range of CNE are
possible.11
While Proposition 3.4.1 tells us everything there is to know about CNE, it is silent
about NCNE. We do know that NCNE exist for plurality (Eaton and Lipsey, 1985), but not
for antiplurality (Cox, 1987), both of which are examples of best-worst rules, so the picture
is not at all clear in general.
It turns out that, for NCNE to exist, it must be that c< 1. In other words, the value
of a positive vote must outweigh the value of a negative vote in order for the candidates to
be induced to adopt divergent policies. Otherwise, the centripetal incentive to avoid being
singled out as the worst candidate is too strong and only CNE can exist. This also implies
that CNE and NCNE cannot exist simultaneously for the same rule.12
Proposition 3.4.2. The rule s = (c,m) does not admit NCNE if c≥ 1.
Proof. Consider candidate 1 at position x1, which is occupied by n1 candidates, where
2 ≤ n1 ≤ m− 2. Consider intervals I1 = [0,x1] and I2 = [(x1 + xq)/2,1]. If 1 makes an
infinitesimal move to the right of x1, then in the rankings of voters in I1, of which there is
positive measure by Lemma 3.8.1, she falls behind the other n1−1 candidates originally
at x1, thus losing their positive votes. On the other hand, 1 rises ahead of these n1− 1
candidates in the rankings of all other voters and, in particular, no longer receives a negative
vote from any voter. Then, the score candidate 1 loses by making this move is vlost = 1n1 `(I1).
On the other hand, 1’s gain from this move is vgained = 1n1 c`(I2).
For NCNE, it must be the case that vlost ≥ vgained , or `(I1) ≥ c`(I2). Since we
11Provided m> 2; if m = 2, any rule reduces to plurality.
12They can coexist for other scoring rules (Cahan and Slinko, 2017) outside the class of best-worst rules.
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assume c≥ 1, this implies that `(I1)≥ `(I2), or x1≥ 1−(x1+xq)/2. Similar considerations
with respect to candidate q yields the requirement that `([xq,1]) ≥ `([0,(x1 + xq)/2], or
1− xq ≥ (x1+ xq)/2. Together, these two conditions imply that x1 ≥ xq, an impossibility
for an NCNE.
Before we proceed to our characterisation, some additional notation. Let
(i) I1 = [0,(x1+ x2)/2],
(ii) Ii = [(xi−1+ xi)/2,(xi+ xi+1)/2] for 2≤ i≤ q−1,
(iii) Iq = [(xq−1+ xq)/2,1],
be the “full-electorates” around each of the occupied positions. A full-electorate Ii is the
set of voters for whom a given occupied position xi is the nearest, so that any candidates
located there are ranked first equal for these voters. For each i ∈ [q] let ILi = {y ∈ Ii : y≤ xi}
and IRi = {y ∈ Ii : y ≥ xi} be the left and right “half-electorates” whose union is the full-
electorate Ii. That is, we simply partition a full-electorate into those voters whose ideal
positions lie to the left of the given occupied position and those who lie to the right. Note
that `(IRi ) = `(I
L
i+1) for i ∈ [q−1].
We now present our characterisation of NCNE for best-worst rules, Theorem 3.4.3,
which provides five necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile to be an NCNE for a
given best-worst rule. Condition (i) states that the outermost occupied positions must be
occupied by two candidates apiece. It is clear that they cannot be single candidates, but this
condition also excludes the possibility of more than two candidates, as in the well-known
case of plurality (see Eaton and Lipsey, 1975). The second condition says that all paired
candidates’ half-electorates are the same length, excluding end electorates, while (iii) relates
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these interior half-electorates to the outermost half-electorates. Conditions (iv) and (v)
put restrictions on the lengths of various electorates: first, an unpaired candidate’s full-
electorate cannot be smaller than any half-electorate (excluding end half-electorates); and,
second, a paired candidate’s half-electorate cannot be smaller than an unpaired candidate’s
half-electorate (excluding end half-electorates).
An important observation to make is that, with the exception of (iii), all the remain-
ing conditions are identical for any rule—they do not depend directly on c, as long as c< 1.
This implies that the equilibrium spacing will be affected by c, but not the configuration of
the candidates, i.e., the number of occupied positions and how many candidates occupy
them. Thus, if they exist (we will see shortly that they do for any rule with c< 1), NCNE for
best-worse rules will have the same general form as NCNE for plurality, the only difference
being the exact location of the platforms x1, . . . ,xq.
Theorem 3.4.3. Given a rule s = (c,m), with c< 1, the following conditions are necessary
and sufficient for a profile x to be an NCNE:
(i) ni≤ 2 for all i∈ [q] and n1 = nq = 2. That is, candidates at the most extreme occupied
positions are paired.
(ii) If ni = 2 for 1< i< q, then `(ILi ) = `(I
R
i ) = `(I
R
1 ) = `(I
L
q ). Let I
p denote this common
measure. That is, all paired candidates’ half-electorates are the same length (except
end half-electorates).
(iii) `(IL1 ) = `(I
R
q ) = I
p+ c2 .
(iv) If ni = 1, then both `(Ii)≥ `(ILk ) for all k 6= 1 and `(Ii)≥ `(IRk ) for all k 6= q. That is,
any (unpaired) candidate’s full-electorate is no smaller than any other half-electorate
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(excluding end half-electorates).
(v) Ip≥ `(ILk ) for all k 6= 1 and Ip≥ `(IRk ) for all k 6= q. That is, a paired candidate’s half-
electorate (excluding end half-electorates) is no smaller than any other (unpaired)
candidate’s half-electorate (excluding the end half-electorates).
Proof. That (i) is necessary follows from Lemma 3.8.4, so we start by showing the necessity
of (ii). Suppose candidate j is at xi, where ni = 2 and suppose without loss of generality that
`(ILi )>`(I
R
i ). Then v j(x
i−,x− j)= `(ILi )>`(IRi )= v j(xi+,x− j), contradicting Lemma 3.8.2.
So `(ILi ) = `(I
R
i ). Let I
p denote this common measure. Moreover, note that v1(x1+,x−1) =
`(IR1 ). Using Lemmas 3.8.2 and 3.8.3, we know v1(x
1+,x−i) = v1(x) = v j(x) = Ip, so that
`(IR1 ) = I
p. Similarly, `(ILq ) = I
p. Hence, condition (ii) is necessary.
Now condition (iii). Note that we must have `(IL1 ) = `(I
R
q ). Otherwise, if `(I
L
1 )>
`(IRq ), then, using Lemmas 3.8.2 and 3.8.3,
vq(x) = v1(x) = v1(x1−,x−1)> vq(xq+,x−q) = vq(x),
a contradiction. Thus, (x1 + xq)/2 = 1/2. Hence, v1(x) = 12(`(I1)+ I
p)− c4 , which, by
Lemma 3.8.2, is equal to v1(x1+,x−1) = Ip, so `(IL1 ) = I
p+ c2 .
Now conditions (iv) and (v). Let candidate l be at xi. Then, if ni = 1, we have
vl(x) = `(Ii). Suppose there is some k> 1 such that `(Ii)< `(ILk ). Clearly the half electorate
ILk could not be i’s half electorate, i.e. k = i or k = i+1. So we have
vl(xk−,x−l) = `(ILk )> `(Ii) = vl(x),
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so this is not an NCNE. So we must have `(ILk ) ≤ `(Ii). For (v), if ni = 2, then (noting
that i can be 1 or q since all paired candidates receive the same score by Lemma 3.8.3)
vl(x) = Ip, which, to avoid contradiction, implies Ip ≥ `(ILk ) for all k 6= 1. Similarly for
right electorates.
Now sufficiency. We need to check that no candidate can deviate profitably. Con-
sider candidate i at x j, where n j = 2 (i could be an end candidate). We know that
all paired candidates get the same score, vi(x) = Ip, and that vi(x1−,x−1) = vi(x), so i
would not want to deviate to x1− or xq+. Also, if t ∈ (xk,xk+1) for some k < q, then
vi(t,x−1) = `(IRk )≤ Ip = vi(x) by condition (v). Candidate i would also not deviate to an
occupied position xk, k 6= j. Doing so would yield a score of vi(xk,x−i) = 23 Ip < vi(x) if
nk = 2 or a score of vi(xk,x−i) = 12`(Ik) =
1
2(`(I
L
k )+ `(I
R
k ))≤ Ip = vi(x) if nk = 1, by (v).
So no paired candidates would deviate.
Consider an unpaired candidate i at position x j. Then vi(x) = `(I j). Clearly any
moves within the interval (x j−1,x j+1) do not change i’s score. Suppose t ∈ (xk,xk+1)
for some k /∈ { j− 1, j,q}. Then vi(t,x−i) = `(IRk ) ≤ `(I j) = vi(x), so i will not move
to any unoccupied position. Suppose nk = 2 and k /∈ { j− 1, j+ 1}. Then vi(xk,x−i) =
2
3 I
p < Ip ≤ `(I j) = vi(x), by (iv). Suppose nk = 1 and k /∈ { j−1, j+1}. Then vi(xk,x−i) =
1
2(`(I
L
k )+`(I
R
k ))≤ `(I j) = vi(x). So no unpaired candidate wants to deviate to any occupied
position that is not adjacent to the candidate’s current position.
Finally, we check that no unpaired candidate would move to an adjacent occupied
position. If n j−1 = 2, j−1 6= 1, then vi(x j−1,x−i) = 13(Ip+`(I j))≤ 23`(I j)< `(I j) = vi(x).
If j−1 = 1 then vi(x j−1,x−i) = 13(`(IL1 )+ `(I j))− c6 = 13
(
Ip+ c2 + `(I j)
)− c6 ≤ 23`(I j) <
`(I j) = vi(x). If n j−1 = 1, then vi(x j−1,x−i) = 12(`(I
L
j−1)+ `(I j)) ≤ `(I j) = vi(x). So no
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unpaired candidate wants to move to the next left occupied position or, by similar arguments,
to the next right occupied position. We have checked all possible deviations, so x is a
NCNE.
While Theorem 3.4.3 gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an NCNE, it is
not yet clear that these conditions can be satisfied for an arbitrary number m of candidates
and any c< 1. For m = 2 only convergent equilibria may exist. For m = 3, no equilibria
can exist whatsoever by the familiar argument (Eaton and Lipsey, 1975) that one of them
would have to be alone at an outermost occupied position, and would have an incentive to
move inwards. The next result addresses this question and shows that they do indeed exist
for any m≥ 4.
Corollary 3.4.4. For all m≥ 4 NCNE exist for rules s = (c,m) with c< 1, and for m≥ 6
there are infinitely many NCNE for a given rule. Moreover, all NCNE take the same general
form as plurality (they have NCNE with the same number of occupied positions, q, with the
same number of candidates, ni, at each one, but perhaps different locations).
Proof. Consider m≥ 4. Suppose candidates are positioned so that all half-electorates have
the same length, except for end electorates, and n1 = nq = 2. That is, `(ILk ) = `(I
R
j ) = I
p
for all k 6= 1, j 6= q. Then, we place x1 and xq so that (iii) is satisfied, from which it follows
that Ip = 12q(1− c). By construction, then, (iv) and (v) are satisfied, and we have an NCNE.
Next, we show that there are infinitely many NCNE for m≥ 6. If m is even, construct
a profile as above, but with q = (m+ 2)/2 occupied positions, all of them occupied by
two candidates except for the two innermost positions, xk and xk+1, which are occupied
by only one candidate each, and all half-electorates except for the outermost of the same
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length. This will be an equilibrium by the argument of the previous paragraph, with x1
and xq chosen to satisfy (iii). Let us increase the length of each half-electorate except for
IRk and I
L
k+1 by ε> 0, so that I
p′ = Ip+ ε (that is, we are moving all positions inwards at
the expense of the interior two candidates). This maintains (i)-(iii). Condition (iv) will
still be satisfied since the only unpaired candidates are those at xk and xk+1, who have
full-electorates of length `(Ik) = Ip
′
+ `(IRk ) > max{Ip
′
, `(IRk )}. Clearly, (v) will still be
satisfied, since we are increasing the length of Ip and decreasing the length IRk and I
L
k+1.
If there is an odd number of candidates m≥ 7 we can do a similar thing. We start
with q = (m+3)/2 occupied positions, symmetric about the median, which is occupied by
a single candidate. The two innermost occupied positions to the left and right of the median
are also occupied by single candidates. Label the occupied position at the median as xk. All
occupied positions other than these three have two candidates apiece, and we place them so
that all half-electorates except the outermost are of the same length. Again, choose x1 and
xq so that (iii) is satisfied. Now, increase the length of all half-electorates except for ILk and
IRk by ε> 0. As above, this maintains (i)-(iii). Condition (iv) will clearly still be satisfied
for all i 6= k. For Ik, the full electorate is getting smaller, but `(Ik) = 2Ip− Jε> Ip+ ε for
small ε, where J is the number of half intervals to one side of the median that increase in
length. Condition (v) will still be satisfied, since the paired candidates’ half-electorates Ip
are increasing in length, while the unpaired candidates’ half-electorates are either increasing
at the same rate, or getting smaller in the case of ILk and I
R
k .
An important consequence of Theorem 3.4.3 is that plurality rule produces the most
dispersed equilibria, while incorporating a negative vote pulls the platforms inward. Essen-
tially, the correct choice of c allows an election designer to pick any level of equilibrium
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dispersion between that of plurality and full convergence, an important result given the
tradeoff between moderation and representation discussed in the Introduction. This is stated
in Corollary 3.4.5.
Corollary 3.4.5. For a given configuration of candidates, i.e., fixing q and ni for i ∈ [q],
but allowing xi to vary, the most extreme equilibria occur under plurality, and increasing c
lowers the attainable levels of dispersion.
Proof. Given a number of occupied positions q and the number of candidates ni at each of
them, maximising dispersion consists, essentially, in minimising the location of x1. By (iii),
then, we want to minimise Ip. Looking at condition (v), we can see that we will want to to
have `(ILk ) = `(I
R
k ) = I
p, which will then imply that (iv) is satisfied. This will partition the
issue space into 2q intervals Ip and two intervals of length c/2. Thus, 2qIp+ c = 1, so that
Ip = 12q(1− c) and, hence, x1 = 12q(1+ c(q−1)). Increasing c, then, increases x1, leading
to less dispersed equilibria.
It is also important to consider which candidates receive the most support in equi-
librium, as this may determine which platform will be implemented or the distribution of
power in parliament, depending on the context. Corollary 3.4.6 shows that, for any m> 4,
the candidates that adopt the most extreme platforms never win a strictly larger share of
the vote than any other candidate and, thus, can never outperform more centrist candidates.
Additionally, there always exist NCNE in which the candidates that adopt the most extreme
platforms receive strictly less than some other candidate. In these NCNE, one or more less
extreme (and unpaired) candidates have a strictly larger vote share.
Corollary 3.4.6. In NCNE, all paired candidates receive the same vote share, which may
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not strictly exceed an unpaired candidate’s share. Thus, candidates at x1 and xq cannot
do strictly better than any less extreme candidate. Moreover, for any m> 4, there always
exists an NCNE in which candidates at x1 and xq receive strictly less votes than at least
one less extreme (unpaired) candidate.
Proof. The first statement follows from Lemma 3.8.3 and Theorem 3.4.3(iv). For the
second statement, the case m = 5 follow by Corollary 3.4.7. For m≥ 6, such NCNE were
constructed in the second and third paragraphs of the proof of Corollary 3.4.4. Namely, we
position the candidates so that: there is at least one unpaired candidate; n1 = nq = 2; x1
and xq are positioned so that Theorem 3.4.3(iii) is satisfied; and, all half-electorates are the
same length, except for end electorates. In this NCNE, an unpaired candidate obtains twice
the score of a paired candidate, since they have the same full-electorate, but do not have to
share it.
In the case of four or five candidates, there is a unique NCNE.
Corollary 3.4.7. If m = 4, then there is a unique NCNE, given by profile x = ((x1,2),(1−
x1,2)), where x1 = 14(1+ c). If m = 5, then there is a unique NCNE, given by profile
x = ((x1,2),(1/2,1),(1− x1,2)), where x1 = 16(1+2c).
In the four- and five-candidate cases, as expected by Corollary 3.4.5, the amount of
dispersion observed in the candidates’ positions depends on c and is maximal when the rule
is plurality. As c grows towards 1, the positions converge at the median voter position. As c
increases beyond 1, by Proposition 3.4.1, we know that infinitely many CNE are possible in
an interval that becomes increasingly wide. Hence, there is a bifurcation point that divides
CNE from NCNE when c = 1. Moving away from this point, more extreme positions are
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possible—on one side they take the form of CNE, and on the other side they are NCNE.
The six candidate case admits infinitely many equilibria for a given rule, but the
pattern is similar.
Example. With six candidates, there are two possible configurations in an NCNE:
we can have three occupied positions with two candidates apiece; or, we can have four oc-
cupied positions where the inner two positions are occupied by single candidates. Consider
the latter profile first—the former will turn out to be a limiting case of the latter. If (i)-(iii) of
Theorem 3.4.3 are satisfied, condition (iv) will always be true, since the unpaired candidate
at x2 has full-electorate length `(I2) = Ip + `(IR2 ), which is clearly larger than all other
half-electorates excluding end electorates, which are of length either Ip or `(IR2 ) = `(I
L
3 ).
Thus, the only restriction is condition (v).
To get a maximally dispersed equilibrium, we want Ip to be as small as pos-
sible, which means setting Ip = `(IR2 ) = `(I
L
3 ). This gives equilibrium profile x =
((x1,2),(x2,1),(1− x2,1),(1− x1,2)) where x1 = 18(1+3c) and x2 = 38(1+ c). A number
of these maximally dispersed equilibria are pictured in Figure 3.1 for a few different values
of c.
To obtain a minimally dispersed equilibrium, we want Ip to be as large as possible.
Condition (iv) will always be satisfied, while condition (v) will still be satisfied if the
length of the half-electorates IR2 and I
L
3 go to zero. There, the interior two candidates
converge at the median and we are left with minimally dispersed equilibrium profile
x = ((x1,2),(1/2,2),(1− x1,2)) where x1 = 16(1+2c). Thus, the unique equilibrium with
three occupied positions is the limiting case of the equilibria with four occupied positions.
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These equilibria are depicted in Figure 3.2.
c = 0 •• • • ••
c = 0.25 •• • • ••
c = 0.5 •• • • ••
c = 0.75 •• • • ••
c = 1
••••••
Figure 3.1: Maximally dispersed NCNE for different choices of c.
c = 0 •• •• ••
c = 0.25 •• •• ••
c = 0.5 •• •• ••
c = 0.75 •• •• ••
c = 1
••••••
Figure 3.2: Minimally dispersed NCNE for different choices of c.
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3.5 Discussion and extensions
Here we discuss a number of the assumptions underlying our model and the extent
to which the results extend to more general settings.
3.5.1 Uniform distribution
Eaton and Lipsey (1975) showed that when the assumption of a uniform distribution
is relaxed, equilibria seldom exist under plurality. Cox (1990) conjectures that the same is
true for scoring rules, and Osborne (1993) elaborates on and extends the generality of the
arguments (see also Osborne, 1995, Bol et al., 2016, and Xefteris, 2016, for discussions
pertaining to a range of settings, including ours). Our results are subject to the same critique,
and small deviations from uniformity would normally lead to nonexistence of NCNE.
While the assumption of uniformity may appear quite restrictive, it has been widely
used in the literature, and there are a number of justifications aside from its simplicity.
First, it has been noted (Aragone´s and Xefteris, 2012; Cahan and Slinko, 2017) that the
distribution of voter ideal points does not literally need to be uniform—all we need is
that the candidates believe the distribution to be uniform or assume it as a simplifying
assumption in their calculations, which is already substantially more realistic.
Second, our results also extend to distributions that may be arbitrarily non-uniform
in the tails. That is, if the profile x = ((x1,n1), . . . ,(xq,nq)) is an NCNE for a uniform
distribution, it will still be an NCNE if we distort the shape of the distribution outside of the
interval (x1,xq), while keeping the mass in each tail the same.13 This observation is implicit
13For a uniform distribution, the fraction of voters in an interval is proportional to the interval’s length,
which makes the vote share constant between occupied positions. Deviations from uniformity creates peaks
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in the result of Eaton and Lipsey (1975) and helps somewhat to alleviate concerns about
the implausible step-function nature of the uniform distribution. Perhaps more importantly,
combining this argument with our results for best-worst rules leads to a stronger converse
of sorts—for any distribution that is uniform on some open interval containing the median
voter’s ideal point, NCNE exist for c < 1, when c is close enough to 1. This is because,
as c tends towards 1, the amount of possible dispersion is reduced to the point of full
convergence at the median position—at some point all the candidates’ adopted positions
will lie within this uniform part of the distribution. It is not at all unlikely that the candidates
assume the central part of the distribution to be uniform. Indeed, any smooth distribution
will approximate a uniform distribution when we zoom in enough and, in many cases, this
central part of the distribution could realistically be quite large.
3.5.2 Candidate objectives
We focus on candidates who aim to maximise their vote share. This assumption is
natural in a proportional representation setting, where seats are assigned to parties according
to the share of the vote obtained. It is perhaps less natural in settings where the winner
takes all and the losers end up with nothing.14
When candidates seek only to win—i.e., they are indifferent between any outcomes
that give them the same probability of being ranked first among the candidates—the well
known results for vote maximisation (Eaton and Lipsey, 1975; Denzau et al., 1985; Cox,
and troughs in the vote share function, which can induces candidates to deviate. However, the best deviation
into the tail region is always just to the left of x1 or just to the right of xq, regardless of nonlinearities outside
these points.
14See also Stigler’s (1972) argument for the assumption of vote maximisation, as well as a discussion in
Denzau et al. (1985).
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1987) are substantially different. In particular, Chisik and Lemke (2006) show that, with
plurality and three candidates, NCNE exist (they do not exist for vote maximisers) in which
one candidate wins outright, and two candidates tie for second (acting as “spoilers” for
each other). In Proposition 3.8.5 in the Appendix, we extend this result to the case of
best-worst rules. We find that NCNE for best-worst rules take a similar form to NCNE under
plurality. In addition—and highly reminiscent of the results under vote maximisation—the
importance of the negative vote should not exceed that of a positive vote and, moreover, the
negative vote acts as a moderating force on possible equilibrium positions.
Cox (1987) studies a few more plausible objectives. Under plurality maximisation,
candidates seek to maximise their margin with respect to the best of their competitors:
vi(x)−max j 6=i v j(x). Complete plurality maximisation is similar but candidates care about
their margins with respect to all other candidates in the race. Cox’s characterisation of
CNE easily extends to plurality and complete plurality maximising candidates. With CNE,
there is only one occupied position and the calculation is straightforward. With NCNE,
considering margins rather than vote shares increases the complexity of the calculations
significantly, and we do not know whether our results generalise. We leave this as an open
question for future research.
3.5.3 Multiple positive and negative votes
We have considered rules in which voters are endowed with a single negative vote
and a single positive vote. A natural generalisation would be a case in which voters have
d1 positive votes and d2 negative votes. As before, a positive vote earns a candidate 1
point while a negative vote is worth −c points. A rule of this kind can be described by
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a four-tuple s = (c,d1,d2,m).15 We refer to this class of rules as generalised best-worst
voting rules as opposed to the standard best-worst rules where d1 = d2 = 1.
As the number of candidates grows, the combinatorics of generalised best-worst
rules quickly become daunting, as illustrated by the six-candidate example below. A
complete characterisation of NCNE is not straightforward, though we are able to make
some progress for the special cases of four, five and six candidates. In the first two cases,
only standard best-worst rules allow NCNE.
Proposition 3.5.1. For m = 4 or m = 5, the rule s = (c,d1,d2,m) allows NCNE only if
d1 = d2 = 1, in which case NCNE are described by Corollary 3.4.7.
Proof. It can be verified through straightforward but tedious calculations.
For six candidates, on the other hand, NCNE do exist more broadly. We investigate
NCNE of the form x = ((x1,3),(1− x1,3)) in Example 3.8.6 in the Appendix. We find that
rich equilibrium behaviour may be observed for generalised best-worst voting rules. In
many cases, properties reminiscent of the standard case carry through—the weight placed
on negative votes is bounded above and increasing c reduces the amount of dispersion that
may be observed in NCNE. This behaviour, however, is no longer the only show in town,
and in one case we see quite the opposite properties. Investigating generalised best-worst
rules further would take us outside the scope of this paper, but would be a fruitful avenue
for future research.
15In scoring rule notation, s = (1, . . . ,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
d1
,0, . . . ,0,−c, . . . ,−c︸ ︷︷ ︸
d2
).
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3.6 Conclusion
Different voting systems provide political candidates with different incentives and,
hence, lead to different outcomes, not all of which are socially desirable. One would
usually want a voting system in which adopting extremist positions is not encouraged while,
at the same time, voters are presented with some choice over the policies advocated by
the candidates. One might also prefer that the candidates that choose the most extreme
positions do not win the greatest electoral support. We have shown that the class of
best-worst rules offers a solid middle ground when voters have one positive vote and one
negative vote of relatively less importance, i.e., so that one negative vote does not cancel
out one positive vote. In particular, nonconvergent equilibria exist, and candidates adopt
diffferent platforms in a very similar way to under plurality. Importantly, however, the
strong best-rewarding incentives of plurality are tempered by the need to avoid negative
votes and, indeed, any degree of dispersion between the extreme cases of plurality and
full convergence of antiplurality can be obtained for the correct relative importance of the
negative vote. The need to avoid negative votes leads candidates to moderate their platforms,
but without sacrificing diversity entirely. Moreover, when there are at least five candidates,
there always exist equilibria in which the most extreme candidates do not receive the most
support.
Though natural, best-worst rules have not been used in practice, as is the case
for many of the voting rules studied in the social choice literature. However, our results
provide evidence that this system is worthy of consideration and presents several desirable
properties.
Future research should investigate the properties of best-worst voting rules in more
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realistic spatial models with, for example, strategic or probabilistic voting, or endogenous
candidacy. It would also be useful to comprehensively study generalised best-worst voting
rules, as well alternative candidate objectives.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Preliminary results and lemmata
We include here a number of lemmata that are needed for our main results. Several
of these minor results are adapted from results in Cahan and Slinko (2017), though similar
conditions have appeared in various form in the previous literature since at least Eaton and
Lipsey (1975).
The first lemma tells us that the most extreme occupied positions cannot be occupied
by single candidates, and they cannot be located at the most extreme points on the issue
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space.
Lemma 3.8.1 (Cahan and Slinko, 2017). In an NCNE, we must have n1,nq ≥ 2. Moreover,
no candidate may adopt the most extreme positions on the issue space. That is, 0< x1 and
xq < 1.
Proof. Evidently, an unpaired candidate at x1 could move to the right and capture a larger
share of positive votes and, at the same time, reduce the number of negative votes.
To see the second part, suppose x1 = 0. Then the at least two candidates at x1 are
ranked last equal by a positive measure of voters in the interval (1− 12xq,1]. By moving to
x1+, however, a candidate originally at x1 is no longer ranked last by any voters, but still
receives the same number of first-place rankings.
The next lemma puts a condition on the continuity of the function vi(t,x−i) when, in
equilibrium, i is at a position occupied by one other candidate and makes a small deviation.
Lemma 3.8.2. Suppose at profile x candidate i is at xl and nl = 2. Then vi(xl−,x−i)+
vi(xl+,x−i)= 2vi(x). In particular, when x is in NCNE, we have vi(xl−,x−i)= vi(xl+,x−i)=
vi(x).
Proof. The issue space can be divided into subintervals of voters who all rank i in the
same position. The immediate interval around xl , Il = ILl ∪ IRl , is the set of voters from
which the candidate receives positive votes. Let J be the interval of voters from which i
receives negative votes. In particular, J is nonempty only if l = 1 or l = q, and it is located
at the opposite side of the issue space. Thus, if l /∈ {1,q}, we have vi(x) = 12(`(ILl )+ `(IRl )).
Then vi(xl−,x−i) = `(ILl ) and vi(x
l+,x−i) = `(IRl ). For NCNE, we need vi(x
l−,x−i)≤ vi(x)
and vi(xl+,x−i)≤ vi(x). Summing these inequalities, we need vi(xl−,x−i)+ vi(xl+,x−i)≤
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2vi(x). This, in fact, turns out to be an equality, so that we must have vi(xl−,x−i) =
vi(xl+,x−i) = vi(x).
If l = 1 (symmetrically for l = q), we have vi(x) = 12(`(I
L
l ) + `(I
R
l ))− c2`(J).
Also, vi(xl−,x−i) = `(ILl )− c`(J) and vi(xl+,x−i) = `(IRl ). As in the previous case, sum-
ming the requirements that these two moves not be beneficial, we find that vi(xl−,x−i) =
vi(xl+,x−i) = vi(x).
Lemma 3.8.3. If ni = n j = 2, then vi(x) = v j(x) in NCNE.
Proof. Let k be a candidate at xi and l be a candidate at x j. Note that if k moves to
x j+ or x j−, due to the nature of the voting rule, k receives exactly the same score as l
would recieve on moving to x j+ or x j−. So vk(x j+,x−k) = vl(x j+,x−l). Then, if x is in
NCNE, using Lemma 3.8.2 gives that vl(x) = vl(x j+,x−l) = vk(x j+,x−k)≤ vk(x). Similarly,
vl(xi+,x−l) = vk(xi+,x−k), from which it follows that vk(x) = vk(xi+,x−k) = vl(xi+,x−l)≤
vl(x). So vk(x) = vl(x).
Next, we note that there cannot be more than two candidates at any position. In
particular, this implies that there cannot exist NCNE for m = 3, a well known result.
Lemma 3.8.4. In any NCNE, at any given position there are no more than two candidates.
Moreover, n1 = nq = 2.
Proof. By Corollary 3.4.2 we have to consider only the case when c< 1.
First, we show that, in NCNE, ni ≤ 2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ q− 1. If ni > 2, where
2≤ i≤ q−1, then candidate k, located at xi is not ranked last by any voter. Moreover, she is
not ranked last by any voter even on deviating to xi+ or xi−. So the only change in her score
on making these moves is from voters in the immediate subintervals I1 = [(xi−1+ xi)/2,xi]
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and I2 = [xi,(xi+ xi+1)/2], where voters change candidate k from first equal to first, and
from first equal to nith, respectively.
In NCNE we must have
vk(xi−,x−k)− vk(x) = `(I1)− 1ni (`(I1)+ `(I2))≤ 0
and
vk(xi+,x−k)− vk(x) = `(I2)− 1ni (`(I1)+ `(I2))≤ 0.
Adding together these two inequalities we get the requirement that ni ≤ 2.
To show that n1 = nq = 2, let us introduce the following notation: I1 = [0,x1],
the voters to the left of candidate 1 (note that by Lemma 3.8.1, this set has positive
measure); I2 = [x1,(x1+ x2)/2], the voters in half the interval between candidates 1 and 2;
I3 = [(x1+ xq)/2,1], the voters for whom 1 is ranked last equal.
Note that v1(x) = 1n1 (`(I1)+ `(I2))− cn1 `(I3). Consider if 1 moves to x1−. Then
v1(x1−,x−1) = `(I1)− c`(I3)). If 1 moves to x1+ then v1(x1+,x−1) = `(I2). For NCNE we
require that these moves not be beneficial to candidate 1. That is, v1(x1−,x−1) ≤ v1(x)
which implies we need
`(I1)− c`(I3))≤ 1n1 (`(I1)+ `(I2))−
c
n1
`(I3),
or (
1− 1
n1
)
c`(I3)≥ `(I1)− 1n1 (`(I1)+ `(I2)). (3.1)
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Similarly, for the other move we have v1(x1+,x−1)≤ v1(x) which gives us
`(I2)≤ 1n1 (`(I1)+ `(I2))−
c
n1
`(I3),
implying (
1− 1
n1
)
c`(I3)≤
(
1− 1
n1
)
(`(I1)+ `(I2))− (n1−1)`(I2).
Combining this last equation with (3.1) yields (2− n1)`(I2) ≥ 0, which means n1 ≤ 2.
Hence, n1 = 2, since we cannot have a lone candidate at x1. A similar argument gives
nq = 2.
3.8.2 Win maximisation and generalised best-worst voting rules
The following result and example relate to the discussion in Section 3.5.
Proposition 3.8.5. When candidates only care about winning, the profile x = (x1,x2,x3),
x1 ≤ x2 < x3, is an NCNE in which candidate 3 wins if and only if the following are satisfied
(by symmetry, a corresponding set of NCNE exists where candidate 1 wins):
(i) 2(1+ c)> (2c+3)x2+(2c+1)x3;
(ii) 2(1+ c)< (2c+3)x3+(2c+1)x1;
(iii) x3− x1 < 23(1− c).
Proof. First, there cannot be an equilibrium with a tie for first, since candidates 1 or 3
could move inwards and break the tie. Second, 2 could never win in an NCNE since we
would then require that both v1(x2,x−1)< v3(x2,x−1) and v3(x2,x−3)< v1(x2,x−3), that is,
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neither 1 nor 3 should want to deviate to x2. Summing together these inequalities leads to
the requirement that v2(x) = 12(x3−x1)< 1−c3(1+c) . If c≥ 1, this is impossible. If c< 1, note
that v2(x)< 1−c3(1+c) <
1
3(1− c), which contradicts that 2 is winning since to be winning 2
must receive more than 1/3 of the total votes. So there must be a unique winner—suppose
without loss of generality it is candidate 3.
Assume x1 < x2 < x3. For NCNE, 1 should not want to move to x−2 , x2 or x
+
2 . For
the first move, we need v1(x−2 ,x−1) < v3(x
−
2 ,x−1), which yields (i). If this move is not
beneficial, neither will be the other two. For the second move, 1 and 2 are now tied, and
since 3’s score does not change (that is, v3(x2,x−1) = v3(x−2 ,x−1)), 3 must still be winning.
For the third move, 3 is still winning, since this is the same as the first move but swapping
the labels on candidates 1 and 2. Since none of these three moves are beneficial for 1, it
is clear that 2 would not want to move to x−1 , x1 or x
+
1 (all three moves would lead to 3
winning by an even bigger margin than if 1 deviated).
We also require that 2 not want to move to x+3 , x3 or x
−
3 . For the first move, we need
v1(x+3 ,x−2)> v2(x
+
3 ,x−2), which yields (ii). If this is true then, for the second move, 2 and
3 are now tied, and since 1’s score does not change (that is, v1(x3,x−2) = v1(x+3 ,x−2)), 1
would win here too. For the third move, 1 would again win, since this is the same as the
first move but swapping the labels on candidates 2 and 3. Since 2 does not want to move to
any of these three positions, it is clear that 1 would not want to move to either (candidate 2
would certainly win).
Next, suppose (iii) is not satisfied, so x3− x1 ≥ 23(1− c). Consider if candidate
2 deviates to any point t between x1 and x3, in which case 2’s score remains constant
at (x3− x1)/2. Note also that v1(t,x−2) and v3(t,x−2) are increasing and decreasing,
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respectively, in t. By the above, when t = x+1 , 3 is the sole winner, while 2 is the sole winner
when t = x−3 . Therefore, at some point t
′ it must be the case that v1(t ′,x−2) = v3(t ′,x−2).
For NCNE, it must be that v1(t ′,x−2) = v3(t ′,x−2)> v2(t ′,x−2). However, the sum of the
scores is fixed at 1− c, which contradicts the previous statement and the assumption that
x3− x1 ≥ 23(1− c). So (iii) is necessary. Since 2 does not benefit from any move between
x1 and x3, it is also the case that 1 would not benefit from moving between x2 and x3.
Sufficiency of (i)-(iii) follows by construction, since we have checked all potentially
profitable deviations. The above arguments also apply when x1 = x2, and are simpler
because some of the deviations become redundant.
Example 3.8.6. We investigate equilibria of the form x = ((x1,3),(1− x1,3)). That is,
NCNE with three candidates apiece at two symmetric occupied positions. Recall that for a
standard best-worst rule, it is never possible to have three candidates at a single position in
an NCNE. For generalised best-worst rules, such NCNE may indeed exist.
We may apply Theorem 5 of Cahan and Slinko (2017), which characterises “bi-
positional symmetric” equilibria for arbitrary scoring rules. First, we find that NCNE
cannot exist for d1 ≥ 3, so there can be at most two positive votes. If d1 = 2, we find that
bipositional symmetric NCNE exist for any d2 < 5 and they exist if and only if one of the
following is true:
(i) If d2 = 0 (equivalently, d2 = 4) and 1/6≤ x1 ≤ 1/3.
(ii) If d2 = 1, c< 2, and (1+ c)/6≤ x1 ≤ (1+ c)/3.
(iii) If d2 = 2, c< 1, and (1+2c)/6≤ x1 ≤ (2+ c)/6.
(iv) If d2 = 3, c≤ 1, and (1+3c)/(6(1+ c))≤ x1 ≤ 1/3.
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In cases (ii)-(iv), we note some interesting similarities to case of standard best-worst rules
described in Theorem 3.4.3. First, the weight placed on the negative votes should not be
too high for NCNE to exist, although the bound need not always be 1. Second, the presence
of negative votes again induces moderation in the set of possible equilibrium profiles. As c
approaches its upper bound, the extreme most positions possible in NCNE move closer to
the median voter (though need not converge).16
If d1 = 1, bipositional symmetric NCNE only exist if d2 = 4 and c ≥ 1. Any x1
satisfying (2+c)/(6(1+c))≤ x1≤ (1+2c)/(6(1+c)) is an NCNE. This is quite different
to the NCNE described above as well as NCNE for standard best-worst rules—here, there
is a lower bound on the value of c and, as c increases, the range of possible NCNE positions
becomes wider and includes NCNE that are more dispersed. This shows that while negative
votes may have similar moderating effects for generalized best-worst rules as for standard
best-worst rules in some cases, in other cases these patterns may break down.
16Case (i) is equivalent to 2-approval for any c, so it is not surprising that c does not matter.
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